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1 INTRODUCTION: SOCIAL DISCRIMINATION 
 
Experiencing an incidence of social discrimination is a fact of everyday 
life for members of stigmatized groups in our society such as homosexuals, 
immigrants, women, or people with disabiities. They are likely to face insults, 
harassment, rejection, overt hostility, or even physical attacks on a daily basis 
due to their belonging to a specific group. In a recent survey (City of Munich, 
2004) 2,500 lesbians and gays indicated what kind of discrimination they are 
facing in daily life due to their sexual orientation. Sixty per cent reported to have 
been confronted with insults, 20 % said that they had been physically attacked, 
and 40 % even mentioned have had to face psychological pressure, 
harassment, and intimidation. Moreover, 35 % reported experiences of 
discrimination and rejection even from some family members. At the workplace 
21 % said they had encountered negative experiences with their employer after 
their sexual orientation was known. Finally, 14 % even stated that they had 
experienced actual sexual harassment at work. This example illustrates how 
pervasive the experience of social discrimination is across a variety of situations 
in the daily life. These results are especially alarming because four directives of 
the European Union, the resulting antidiscrimination law in Germany, and the 
German constitution prohibit and combat discrimination based on racial or 
ethnic origin, religion, handicap, age, or sexual orientation. Taken into account 
that homosexuals are a group that is more and more present in the media (e.g., 
presence in soaps or commercials) and thus certainly less stigmatized than 
other minorities, social discrimination still has to be considered as a major 
problem in our society. 
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Although today people make an effort to behave politically correct in 
terms of not discriminating against someone, and given too that constitutions 
strengthen equal rights for each group in society, some social groups are 
nonetheless clearly disadvantaged. These disadvantages can be expressed 
both in terms of economic opportunities and outcomes such as barriers to 
obtaining housing, education, employment, or even proper health care (e.g., 
Braddock & McPartland, 1987; Cash, Gillen, & Burns, 1977; Keck, 2004; 
Neckerman & Kirschenman, 1991; Treiman & Hartmann, 1981; Yinger, 1994), 
and in terms of interpersonal interactions such as insults, exclusion, belittlement, 
or exposure to racist and sexist jokes (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Gaertner 
& Dovidio, 1986; Pettigrew & Martin, 1987). 
How do individuals respond to negative experiences such as these? To 
date, most research has studied primarily depressive mood as an immediate 
response (for an overview see Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002). In order to gain 
a better understanding of the immediate response to social discrimination, this 
thesis expands the study of immediate responses to social discrimination from 
depressive mood to anger, more precisely the two directions of anger: anger 
towards the self and anger towards another. 
This chapter summarizes first the previous research in the field of social 
discrimination by illustrating (a) the impact of subtle modern prejudice, (b) the 
focus of the previous research in this field, (c) the resulting implications for the 
target, (d) the nature of social discrimination, (e) the short-term effects of social 
discrimination, and (f) the social category as part of the self. Secondly, I then 
specify in which ways my own research extends existing knowledge in the field 
of the target’s affective responses to social discrimination by studying (1) self- 
and other-directed anger, (2) the impact of social identification, and (3) 
perceived legitimacy of a negative group-based treatment on anger. 
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1.1 The impact of subtle modern prejudice 
Although survey studies indicate that the level of expressed racism has 
declined in the United States over the last decades (e.g., Crosby, Bromley, & 
Saxe, 1980; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986), at the same time other researchers 
(e.g., Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Devine, 1989) assume that negative attitudes 
towards African-Americans may have become more subtle or disguised but are 
still pervasive, even among people who consider themselves nonprejudiced. 
More recent research has investigated subtle forms of prejudice (e.g., Barreto & 
Ellemers, 2005; Operario & Fiske, 2001; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). These 
studies suggest that these more indirect forms of prejudice have come to 
preserve racial, ethnic, gender, and religious stratification. They are covert 
means of expressing prejudice that are more cool, close and indirect compared 
to blatant prejudice (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Following Barreto and 
Ellemers (2005), old-fashioned sexism elicited more hostility among women and 
men compared to modern sexism. More interestingly, modern sexism induced 
more anxiety among women compared to old-fashioned sexism. Thus, there is 
evidence indicating that although prejudice and social discrimination seem to 
have become more subtle, they still affect the targets and are pervasive for 
them. 
 
1.2 The focus of research on social discrimination 
Throughout the past twenty years, research on social discrimination 
moved increasingly from explaining why social discrimination is shown (the 
perspective of the perpetrator of social discrimination) to how social 
discrimination affects its targets (the perspective of the target of social 
discrimination). There is a large body of literature that has examined the 
perpetrator’s perspective by studying for example interindividual differences in 
stereotyped beliefs, prejudicial attitudes, and a willingness to discriminate 
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against a variety of devalued groups, as well as studies focusing on specific 
emotions (e.g., Amodio & Devine, 2005; Banaji & Greenwald, 1994; 
Bodenhausen, Macrae, & Gast, 1998; Crosby et al., 1980; DeSteno, Dasgupta, 
& Bartlett, 2004; Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Gaertner, & Nier, 2004; Greenwald, 
Banaji, & Rudman, 2002; Leach, Spears, & Branscombe, 2003; Monteith & 
Voils, 2001; Mummendey, 1995; Mummendey & Otten, 2004; Mummendey, 
Otten, Berger, & Kessler, 2000; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Otten, 
Mummendey, & Blanz, 2001). In contrast, some researchers have begun to 
investigate the target’s perspective by concentrating for example on the 
responses when coping with being devalued by society due to a specific group 
membership (e.g., Allport, 1954/1979; Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; 
Crocker & Major, 1989; Crosby, 1982; Cross, 1991; Dion & Earn, 1975;  Major, 
Quinton, McCoy, & Schmader, 2000; Major et al., 2002; McCoy & Major, 2003; 
Miller & Major, 2000; Steele & Aronson, 1995; Swim & Stangor, 1998). 
Individuals differ in the extent to how they perceive and respond to a situation 
where they face social discrimination. Thus, further research has studied the 
impact of these interindividual differences, such as social identification 
(Branscombe et al., 1999; Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991; Jetten, 
Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001; Major, Quinton, & Schmader, 2003; 
McCoy & Major, 2003; Mossakowski, 2003; Operario & Fiske, 2001; Sellers & 
Shelton, 2003; Wong, Eccles, & Sameroff, 2003), sensitivity to race-based 
rejection (Ayduk, Downey, & Kim, 2001; Ayduk, May, Downey, & Higgins, 2003; 
Ayduk, Mendoza-Denton, Mischel, Downey, Peake, & Rodriguez, 2000; Levy, 
Ayduk, & Downey, 2001; Mendoza-Denton, Downey, Purdie, Davis, & Pietrzak, 
2002), and stigma consciousness (Brown & Pinel, 2003; Pinel, 1999, 2002, 
2004). To study interindividual differences seems worthwhile especially 
following the advice of some scholars. Shelton (2000, p. 375) recommends 
studying targets of social discrimination as “functioning individuals who can 
influence the intergroup dynamics”. As a consequence, Sassenberg and 
Hansen (2005, p. 3) suggest it is circumspect to study victims of social 
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discrimination “as motivated human being, and not as objects of discriminatory 
acts”. These recommendations both suggest examining the targets as 
individuals who are actively responding to the experience of social 
discrimination. 
To sum up, most of the research has so far paid attention to the 
perpetrator’s perspective of social discrimination. Thus, this thesis focuses on 
the target’s perspective of social discrimination and, more precisely, on her/his 
active response to social discrimination. The investigation of affective 
responses especially in this context is important. Following appraisal theories of 
emotions (e.g., Frijda, 1996; Roseman, Wiest, & Swartz, 1994), affect is eliciting 
action tendencies. Otherwise if a target does not act to a negative treatment this 
‘non’-behavior is likely to lead to health problems in the long run (for an 
overview see Clark, Anderson, Clark, & Williams, 1999). 
 
1.3 Implications for targets of social discrimination 
What are the psychological consequences of being a target of social 
discrimination? How does facing frequent discrimination influence a 
discriminated individual? There is substantial evidence to suggest that 
discriminatory treatment is harmful for targets at multiple levels (for overviews 
see Clark et al., 1999; Crocker & Major, 1989; Major et al., 2002; Nolen-
Hoeksema & Girgus, 1994). Most research has focused on the impact of social 
discrimination on depressive mood as an immediate response (Major, Kaiser, & 
McCoy, 2003; for an overview see Major et al., 2002; McCoy & Major, 2003). 
Research has shown that the experience of social discrimination does not only 
have pervasive implications for the target in the short run but has also severe 
implications in the long run (Allison, 1998; Abe & Zane, 1990; Aneshensel, 
Clark, & Frerichs, 1983; Branscombe et al., 1999; Clark et al., 1999; Flacke, 
Amaro, Jenkin, Kunitz, Levy, Mikon, & Yu, 1995; Mossakowski, 2003;  
1 Introduction: Social discrimination 13
Noh & Kaspar, 2003; Nolen-Hoeksema & Girgus, 1994; Postmes & 
Branscombe, 2002; Wong et al., 2003). The experience of disadvantage in 
terms of economic and interpersonal outcomes is threatening and 
compromising to the physical well-being of the targets of social discrimination 
(e.g., Allison, 1998; for an overview see Clark et al., 1999). Depression is more 
prevalent in members of some discriminated groups (Mossakowski, 2003; Noh 
& Kaspar, 2003; Wong et al., 2003). For example, studies generally find higher 
levels of depressive symptomatology in African-Americans than in European-
Americans1 (for a discussion see Aneshensel et al., 1983), in Asian-Americans 
than in European-Americans (e.g., Abe & Zane, 1990), and in women than in 
men (for a review see Nolen-Hoeksema & Girgus, 1994). Moreover, African-
Americans experience more physical health problems than European 
Americans, including shorter life expectancies, higher infant mortality and a 
greater incidence of heart disease (Allison, 1998; Flacke et al., 1995). Social 
discrimination is a possible and likely cause for these health problems (Clark et 
al., 1999). In short, there is little doubt that being a target of social discrimination 
poses a significant threat at multiple levels (i.e. psychological and physical). 
Thus in the long run, experiencing social discrimination leads to severe health 
problems for the targets.  
To conclude, being a target of social discrimination has severe 
consequences in terms of depressive symptomatology and health problems. 
However, less is known about the immediate affective response to the 
experience of an incidence of social discrimination except for depressive mood. 
The long-term consequences are most likely an outcome of ‘aggregated 
immediate affective responses’. Thus, this thesis focuses on affect as an 
immediate response to social discrimination. Before becoming more specific 
                                                 
1 When controlling for differences in socioeconomic status, these group differences often 
weaken and disappear. An explanation for this effect is that lower socioeconomic status is 
likely to also be a consequence of a stigma. 
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about the affect studied in this thesis, it is necessary to differentiate the concept 
of social discrimination a little further. 
 
1.4 The nature of social discrimination 
Until now the concepts of social stigma and social discrimination have 
been treated interchangeably in this thesis. In order to understand the 
underlying processes and short-term effects of experiencing an incidence of 
social discrimination, it is necessary to focus on the conditions that define this 
experience. Therefore, social stigma will be defined in a first step and then 
disctinstions are made between social stigma and the concept of social 
discrimination. Finally, conclusions are drawn for the current research. 
 
Social stigma 
Research has shown that in many cases there is widespread agreement 
within a culture about both the devalued status of a group, and the negative 
stereotypes attributed to individuals who belong to this specific group (for a 
discussion see Jost & Banaji, 1994). These negative stereotypes are for 
example already learned by the age of three to devalue people with dark skin 
color (Singleman & Singleton, 1986) or people who are overweight (Dion & 
Berscheid, 1974). Often these stereotypes are held so widely that they are 
identified not as stereotypes, but rather as ‘facts’ (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 
1998). Targets of social discrimination are often members of groups that are 
devalued in our society due to an assumed attribute of their group. In other 
words, they are stigmatized. Defining a single feature of social stigma, Crocker 
and colleagues (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998) argue that stigmatized 
individuals possess (or are believed to possess) some attribute or characteristic 
that conveys a social identity which is devalued in a particular social context. 
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Only attributes that convey a negative social identity are stigmatized. The 
boundaries of one category may be relatively clear, for the example for the 
category of women, but more diffuse for another, for the example for the 
category of disfigured individuals.  
In sum, a social stigma is a function of having an attribute that conveys a 
devalued social identity in a particular context. In other words, the possession of 
a particular attribute might lead an individual to be stigmatized in one context 
but not in another. In essence, the devalued social identity in a particular 
context is not linked to something essential belonging to the stigmatized person. 
It depends mainly on the specific context as Crocker and colleagues (1998, p. 
506) have stated: “[…] the problem of stigma does not reside in the stigmatized 
attribute, or the person who possesses that attribute, but in the unfortunate 
circumstance of possessing an attribute that, in a given social context, leads to 
devaluation.” 
Social stigmas are very diverse. Rather than trying to identify types of 
stigma, researchers have tried to specify dimensions along which stigmatizing 
conditions differ (e.g., Jones, Farina, Hastorf, Markus, Miller, & Scott, 1984). 
One dimension is the visibility of the stigma. Visible stigmas are for example 
gender, race, obesity, or disfiguring conditions that cannot be hidden easily from 
others. Concealable stigmas can not be seen such as university affiliation, 
religious affiliations, homosexuality, or many illnesses. Another dimension is the 
controllability of the stigma. Stigmatizing conditions are controllable when the 
stigmatized individual is responsible for the condition, or when the condition 
results from or could be eliminated by the individual (Weiner, Perry, & 
Magnusson, 1988). For example, research has shown that being overweight is 
regarded as controllable by the stigmatized individual, because that individual is 
responsible for her or his excess weight. On the other hand, blindness is 
considered to be uncontrollable by the stigmatized individual, because that 
individual is not responsible for her or his condition. Consequently, depending 
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on the controllability of own stigma, a stigmatized individual perceives a 
negative treatment due to own stigma as legitimate or illegitimate. Crocker, 
Cornwell, and Major (1993) studied the attribution style of overweight women. 
They found that compared to standard-weight women, overweight women were 
significantly more likely to attribute interpersonal rejection by a male partner to 
their weight, but were not more likely to attribute rejection to their partner’s 
personality or his concern with appearance. Crocker and Major (1994) argued 
that because weight is seen as controllable, overweight women perceived their 
rejection due to their weight as justified differential treatment rather than social 
discrimination. As a result, the perceived controllability of the stigma is likely to 
affect how a stigmatized individual responds to discrimination because of the 
stigma (Crocker, Cornwell, & Major, 1993; Crocker & Major, 1994). 
Results indicate devastating consequences in that stigmatized individuals 
accept the inequality and social discrimination, although it is against their 
interest (for a review see Taylor, Wright, & Porter, 1994). They endorse 
legitimizing beliefs to justify the negative treatment and blame themselves 
rather than others or their situation (Jost & Major, 2001). To date, previous 
research on social stigma has studied such legitimizing beliefs as differing 
interindividual differences, for example the belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980; 
Lerner & Miller, 1978), in personal control (e.g., Major & Schmader, 2001), or 
the myth of stereotypes (e.g., Crocker et al., 1998; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & 
Hunyady, 2002), among others. 
To conclude, the important feature of stigmatization is the possibility that 
one will be the target of a negative treatment because of one’s belonging to a 
specific group that is linked with a specific attribute (Crocker et al., 1998; 
Goffman, 1963; Jones et al., 1984). Furthermore, a negative treatment due to 
own stigma can be perceived as legitimate. This is the case when the 
stigmatized individual endorses legitimizing beliefs that justify the negative 
group-based treatment (e.g., Crocker & Major, 1994). 
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Social discrimination 
To encompass the concept of social stigma within the concept of social 
discrimination, it is necessary to focus on the criteria defining social 
discrimination. According to Major and colleagues (2002, p. 262), “[…] an 
attribution to discrimination is a judgment with two components: (1) the 
individual (or group) was treated unjustly and (2) the treatment was based on 
social identity/group membership” (see also Mummendey & Otten, 2004). 
Consequently, only if the two criteria of perceived illegitimacy and attribution to 
own group membership of a negative treatment are fulfilled it should be called 
an incidence of social discrimination. 
In conclusion, according to this definition an incidence of social 
discrimination will be perceived as illegitimate negative treatment, whereas a 
negative treatment due to own stigma can also be perceived as legitimate. Thus, 
the perceived legitimacy is a crucial factor for the current research on the 
impact of a negative group-based treatment. 
 
1.5 Short-term effects of social discrimination 
Most research has focused on the impact of social discrimination on 
depressive mood as an immediate response (Major et al., 2003a; for an 
overview see Major et al., 2002; McCoy & Major, 2003; Schmitt & Branscombe, 
2002a). For example, McCoy and Major (2003) studied the affective response 
of women. Female participants were invited to participate in a laboratory study 
on first impressions. The participants were required to give a short speech. 
Afterwards they received negative feedback from a fictive male participant. 
Depending on the condition they learned after having received the feedback 
that the male participant was either prejudiced against women or they were 
given no such information. After being exposed to the manipulation of negative 
treatment, the participants had to indicate their depressive mood as a 
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dependent variable. The results of the study show that women evaluated by a 
sexist male reported less depressive mood than women evaluated by a 
nonsexist male. Thus, this study has examined depressive mood as response 
to a negative treatment. In another study, Major and colleagues (2003) 
employed a different paradigm (adapted from Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a, 
Study 2). Male and female students read a vignette in which a male professor 
had rejected their request to enroll on a course. One third read that the 
professor was ‘sexist’ and had excluded only members of the participant’s 
gender (i.e. ‘prejudice’ condition). Another third read that the professor was ‘a 
jerk’ and had excluded everyone who tried to join the class (‘everyone excluded’ 
condition). The remaining third read that the professor ‘thought they were 
stupid’ and had excluded only the participant from the course (‘personal 
rejection’ condition). After reading the vignettes, participants were asked to 
indicate the levels of their depressive mood. As expected, participants reported 
fewer depressive mood in the prejudice condition compared to the personal 
rejection condition. Participants in the personal rejection condition also 
anticipated feeling significantly more depressed than those in the everyone 
excluded condition. The means between the prejudice and everyone rejected 
condition did not differ from each other. Thus, depressive mood as immediate 
response to a negative treatment has been studied in experimental settings as 
well as in vignette studies (for additional examples see Kobrynowicz & 
Branscombe, 1997; Schmitt & Branscombe, 2002a). 
Further research has studied affective responses to long term negative 
treatment. Relative deprivation theory suggests that it is social comparison and 
not objective reality which determines how satisfied or dissatisfied people are 
with what they have (e.g., Crosby, 1976; 1982; Runciman, 1966; Stouffer, 
Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949). People can compare themselves 
with other individuals (egoistic relative deprivation) or between their group and 
other groups (fraternalistic relative deprivation). Fraternalistic relative 
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deprivation is the sense that one’s group is not as successful as other groups 
(Runciman, 1966). Theories of relative deprivation assert that whether or not 
individuals deprived of valued outcomes will feel anger or resentment depends, 
in part, on whether they blame others or themselves for not having those 
outcomes (e.g., Crosby, 1976; 1982). Individuals who are deprived and blame 
others for their disadvantage will experience anger, whereas individuals who 
blame themselves will experience resentment. Thus, this line of research 
studies the affective responses of anger and resentment as a result of long-term 
deprivation (i.e. a possible outcome of social discrimination) and furthermore, 
suggests that these two affects are distinct from each other and are triggered 
differently by the blame for the received outcome. 
Moreover, research on relative deprivation focuses on explaining the 
impact of long-term experience of disadvantage, whereas research on the 
impact of social discrimination (i.e. in this thesis) addresses the experience of 
single incidences of social discrimination. Long-term consequences of 
disadvantage are severe, as documented in a vast boy of literature (for an 
overview see Clark et al., 1999), whereas short-term consequences have been 
to date less well researched.  
To sum up, the impact of social discrimination has been primarily studied 
on depressive mood (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1999; McCoy & Major, 2003) and 
less on anger (e.g., Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001).Therefore, this 
thesis examines the immediate affective response of anger to a negative 
treatment. However, according to Weiner (1985), anger can be directed at the 
self as well as at someone else. Previous research has ignored self-directed 
anger. Thus, both directions of anger – self- and other-directed anger – are 
examined in this thesis. 
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1.6 The social category as part of the self 
The social identity plays a crucial role in the attribution of a negative 
treatment to social discrimination. Social identification indicates how important 
the group membership is for one individual. High identified individuals make 
more attributions to social discrimination than low identified individuals (Major et 
al., 2003b). Thus, social identification has been studied to gain a better 
understanding of the interindividual differences in depressive mood as a 
response to social discrimination (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1999; McCoy & 
Major, 2003). So far, contradictory findings do not allow to determine the exact 
impact of social identification (for details see Chapter 2, p. 26). 
So far the main focus has been on either research on social stigma and 
the impact of other interindividual differences (e.g., belief in a just world, 
personal control) as moderators, or on research on social discrimination 
investigating the impact of social identification on depressive mood. To my 
knowledge, the impact of social identification under the following conditions has 
not been studied; when an individual is (a) confronted with a negative treatment 
resulting from own group membership, when (b) this treatment is perceived to 
be legitimate and when (c) anger is the affective response.Thus, this thesis 
aims to fill this gap by studying the impact of perceived legitimacy of negative 
group-based treatment and social identification on self- and other-directed 
anger. 
 
1.7 Overview of the thesis 
To sum up, psychologists agree that being a target of social 
discrimination is associated with negative psychological and physiological 
consequences (for an overview see Clark et al., 1999). Research on the 
immediate affective consequences of being a target of social discrimination, 
which is most likely a premise of more severe long-term consequences, has 
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focused mainly on depressive mood (for an overview see Major et al., 2002). So 
far, anger – and especially self-directed anger – has not been taken into 
account. Given the importance of anger as a direct affective reaction, this thesis 
investigates the impact of social discrimination on self- and other-directed anger. 
Research has shown that social identification contributes significantly to 
the prediction of the impact of social discrimination on depressive mood (e.g., 
Branscombe et al., 1999; McCoy & Major, 2003). Therefore, it is particulary 
worthwhile to extend the previous research by investigating the impact of social 
identification on self- and other-directed anger when facing a negative treatment.  
Furthermore, previous research on social stigma has stressed the 
importance of the impact of interindividual differences in the experience of own 
stigma. Specific beliefs are likely to legitimize a negative treatment that is 
attributed to own group membership. Thus, including perceived legitimacy as a 
further factor will extend the existing research on the impact of a negative 
group-based treatment on self- and other-directed anger. 
In summary, the goals of the studies presented in this thesis are to gain a 
better understanding of the affective response to social discrimination by 
investigating (1) the impact on anger, (2) the impact of social identification in 
this context, and (3) the impact of perceived legitimacy of a negative group-
based treatment and social identification on anger. More precisely, two types of 
anger are studied: anger towards oneself and anger towards someone else. In 
a series of five studies the goals are put forward to be empirically tested. 
In Chapter 2, entitled “The impact of social identification”, four studies are 
presented that are designed to test the first two goals. More specifically, Study 1 
and 2 test the impact of social discrimination and social identification on anger 
in two different social groups, Study 3 examines the causal direction of the 
relation between social identification and anger, and finally Study 4 aims to 
extend the findings of Studies 1-3 from scenario studies to real life. 
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In Chapter 3, entitled “The moderating effect of perceived legitimacy”, it is 
argued that it is also possible that an individual perceives an experienced 
incidence of social discrimination as legitimate. The third goal mentioned above 
is tested by manipulating the perceived legitimacy of a negative group-based 
treatment in Study 5 to examine the impact of social identification on anger. 
This step extends the existing research in the field of social stigma and social 
discrimination by studying the impact of perceived legitimacy of a negative 
group-based treatment and social identification on anger. 
Chapter 4, entitled “General discussion”, summarizes and discusses the 
main findings of the studies in the light of previous research on depressive 
mood. Furthermore, some ideas for the underlying processes of the effects 
found are outlined, and suggestions for future research that could enlighten our 
understanding of the target’s perspective of social discrimination are made. 
Moreover, in line with the results of this thesis, implications for targets’ 
behavioral responses and health problems are presented. There follows a 
discussion on the impact of perceived legitimacy in the short and long run. 
Finally, the conclusions of this thesis are drawn.
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2 THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL IDENTIFICATION2 
 
Being treated badly is a negative experience for an individual. This 
experience is aversive and hurts. In turn, it is likely to elicit anger as an affective 
response to this treatment. Anger is a primary emotion that is an immediate and 
direct response to the environment and furthermore, it serves to defend oneself 
against attacks (Frijda, 1986). There is evidence that the perception of injustice 
is associated with the affective response of anger (for a review see Miller, 2001). 
Moreover, anger is also a frequent affective response to perceiving that one is a 
target of social discrimination (Swim et al., 2001). According to Weiner (1985), 
anger can be directed at oneself (self-directed anger) or at someone else 
(other-directed anger). If the cause of the bad treatment that an individual faces 
is attributed to another person, the individual will be angry with that person. If 
the cause of this negative treatment can be attributed to oneself, however, the 
individual will most probably be angry with the self. If the cause of a bad 
treatment is attributed to the group membership by the target this is an 
incidence of social discrimination. How an attribution to social discrimination is 
likely to impact on anger will be discussed in detail in the following. 
 
2.1 Attribution to social discrimination: The impact of causal loci 
In order to be called social discrimination, a negative treatment must fulfil 
(as mentioned above, p. 15) two criteria besides being negative: (a) it needs to 
be perceived as illegitimate by the target and (b) it is expressed due to the 
group membership of the target (Major et al., 2002; Mummendey & Otten, 2004). 
Individuals who are targets of social discrimination face an attributional 
ambiguity. They can attribute the negative treatment to different causes: either 
                                                 
2 This chapter has been modified and submitted for publication (Hansen & Sassenberg, 2005). 
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to prejudice, or to their own responsibility (e.g., Crocker et al., 1991; Crocker et 
al., 1993; Major et al., 2003a). Crocker and Major (1989; Crocker et al., 1991) 
assume that attributions to prejudice are external attributions because another 
person behaved in a prejudiced manner. In contrast, Schmitt and Branscombe 
(2002a) suggest that attributions to prejudice have an external and an internal 
component: the prejudiced perpetrator behaving illegitimately as external cause, 
and the target’s group membership triggering the perpetrator’s behavior as an 
internal cause. The later aspect of the attribution is internal because the group 
is part of the self: the social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). These contradictory 
predictions have so far been tested with depressed emotions as dependent 
variable. In order to be able to differentiate between these two assumptions 
concerning the external and internal components of an attribution to prejudice, it 
is necessary to investigate if and how the impact of negative treatment 
attributed to prejudice differs (due to its internal component) from the impact of 
exclusively externally attributed causes for negative treatment. Such an 
exclusively external cause would be merely inappropriate behavior of another 
person that shows no relation whatsoever to one’s group membership. 
Regarding the design of a study, besides a condition with attribution to prejudice 
and a condition with attribution to exclusively external causes, a condition 
allowing for a pure internal attribution (own responsibility) should be included in 
the comparison in order to test for differences between all three conditions. As 
an attribution to prejudice fulfils the criteria of social discrimination – the 
negative and illegitimate treatment being due to the target’s group membership 
– in the following we will refer to this condition as “attribution to social 
discrimination”. 
In conclusion, in line with Schmitt and Branscombe (2002a) I assume 
that an attribution to social discrimination has an external as well as an internal 
component, i.e. the target’s group membership. Therefore, an appropriate test 
of the impact of social identification on anger should include three conditions:  
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(a) attribution to social discrimination versus (b) external attribution versus (c) 
internal attribution (see Figure 1). 
 
2.2 The direction of anger 
The current research studies the impact on the two types of anger. Only 
a few studies have tested the impact of social discrimination on other-directed 
anger, i.e. as hostility towards an outgroup (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1999; 
Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; McCoy & Major, 2003; Wong et al., 2003). 
However, research on social discrimination has so far neglected the fact that 
anger can also be directed at oneself. Weiner (1985) has suggested that the 
causal loci of an attribution do not only have a different impact on affect, but 
also elicit affect directed at different sources. Depending on the causal loci 
anger will be either directed at oneself (e.g., I am angry with myself), or at 
someone else (e.g., I am angry with someone else). An external attribution to a 
negative treatment is likely to elicit anger with the source of treatment (other-
directed anger), whereas an internal attribution is likely to result in anger with 
oneself, i.e. due to one’s own behavior (self-directed anger). An attribution to 
social discrimination will have a similar impact on other-directed anger as an 
external attribution due to the external component and the notion of illegitimacy 
of this attribution. However, its impact on self-directed anger is less clear and 
will be discussed in detail in the next section. The aim of this research is to 
study the impact of attributions of negative treatment on both types of anger 
(self- and other-directed anger). 
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Main effect hypothesis of self- and other-directed anger: 
Self-directed anger is predicted to be higher when the cause of a 
negative treatment is attributed internally compared to when it is 
attributed externally. Other-directed anger is expected to be higher when 
the cause of a negative treatment is attributed to social discrimination 
and external causes compared to when it is attributed internally. 
 
2.3 Attribution as a moderator of the effect of social identification 
on self-directed anger 
The impact of social discrimination on self-directed anger is not that clear. 
Research on the impact of social discrimination on depression has stressed the 
moderating effect of social identification on affective responses. Hence, the 
internal component of an attribution to social discrimination varies because 
individuals differ in the extent to which they include a group in their self-concept 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979). After an attribution to social discrimination, these 
interindividual differences in social identification are likely to determine the 
strength of the effect on self-directed anger. 
Two positions with contradictory assumptions concerning the impact of 
social identification on affect in targets of social discrimination are prominent in 
the literature. On the one hand, McCoy and Major (2003) argue that higher 
levels of social identification lead to higher levels of depression after social 
discrimination. The basis of their hypothesis is that one’s group membership 
forms a larger part of the self the higher one’s social identification with the 
discriminated group is. Therefore, social identification only has a self-protecting 
effect for individuals with low group identification (i.e., who do not consider their 
group membership as a central part of their self-concept). Two recent studies of 
McCoy and Major (2003) showed that women low in gender identification and 
Latin-Americans low in ethnic identification experienced less depressed 
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emotions when a negative feedback was attributed to social discrimination 
compared to attributing it to the inappropriate behavior of the perpetrator. 
On the other hand, several researchers have suggested that a strong 
social identification with one’s group can serve as a psychological buffer against 
the negative consequences of social discrimination (e.g., Cross, 1991; Phinney, 
1990, 1996). They assume that feeling connected with one’s group 
compensates for the negative consequences of social discrimination. Similarly, 
Branscombe and colleagues (1999) argue that high social identification buffers 
the individually experienced consequences of discrimination against one’s 
group by means of a feeling of belonging to that group. This means that highly 
identified individuals can still feel good about themselves when being 
discriminated because they focus on positive aspects of their group 
membership. Branscombe and colleagues (1999) found that higher 
identification with ones ingroup leads to less depressed emotions. They were 
able to show that racial identification compensated the negative impact of 
perceived social discrimination on well-being of African-Americans. 
Additional evidence for the buffering effect of social identification on 
depression has been provided by several researchers (e.g., Mossakowski, 2003; 
Sellers & Shelton, 2003; Wong et al., 2003), indicating an overall effect of high 
social identification protecting the individual when being confronted with social 
discrimination. The only exception stems from research by McCoy and Major 
(2003). Hence, I expect a buffering impact of social identification on self-
directed anger when experiencing social discrimination but not on other-directed 
anger. This should be the case because social identification is related to the self 
and not to the perpetrator. Also, further research (e.g., McCoy & Major, 2003; 
Major et al., 2003a; Crocker et al., 1991) has shown that social identification 
has no effect on anger toward those who are discriminating against oneself. 
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Attribution x Identification interaction hypothesis on self-directed anger:  
Thus, the type of attribution to negative feedback is predicted to 
moderate the impact of social identification on self-directed anger such 
that stronger identification reduces self-directed anger only after an 
attribution to social discrimination but not after an external or internal 
attribution. 
It is not predicted that attribution moderates the impact of social 
identification on other-directed anger, as social identification captures the 
relation between ingroup and the self which does not necessarily relate to other 
social targets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
social 
identificationperpetrator 
 
 
 
external 
 
Social 
discrimination 
 
internal 
 
 
 
 
group 
membership
other-
directed 
anger 
Affective response 
self-
directed 
anger 
Target 
Attribution 
Perpetrator 
Treatment 
negative 
treatment 
 
Figure 1: Schematic presentation of the examined variables in this thesis. 
 
2.4 Overview 
The first four studies of this thesis aim at showing that (a) the impact of 
the type of attribution to negative feedback on self- and other-directed anger 
and (b) the moderating impact of the type of attribution and social identification 
on self-directed anger. In Studies 1-3 participants were told that another ingroup 
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member received negative feedback due to different causes. This information 
constituted a manipulation of three types of attribution: (a) an attribution to 
social discrimination (i.e. an attribution to one’s group membership), (b) an 
external attribution (i.e. an attribution to the source of feedback), and (c) an 
internal attribution (i.e. an attribution to the person’s own behavior) as a control 
condition. In Study 4 a different paradigm was used by asking participants to 
recall a situation in which they personally had experienced a negative treatment. 
This different paradigm was used in order to also test my predictions using real 
personal experiences. The design of Study 1, 2, and 4 were cross-sectional. In 
Study 3 a cross-lagged design was used which allows for a thorough 
investigation of the causal direction concerning the relationships between the 
type of attribution, social identification, and self-directed anger. 
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2.5 Study 1 
2.5.1 Method 
Design and sample 
An experiment with three conditions (attribution to social discrimination vs. 
external attribution vs. internal attribution) was conducted. Social identification 
was measured as independent and self- and other-directed anger as dependent 
variables. Participants were female undergraduates of the University of Jena  
(N = 67; age: M = 23, range: 18-33). They received a bar of chocolate for 
compensation. 
 
Procedure 
Female students were recruited for a study concerning the experience of 
giving a presentation in class. No explicit reference to gender was made during 
the recruitment. They were asked to imagine being in the position of the person 
in the vignette presenting a paper in class and receiving negative feedback  
(a bad grade) afterwards. Depending on the experimental condition, the person 
in the scenario received a bad grade either due to her gender (attribution to 
social discrimination), due to the professor’s unfair behavior (external 
attribution), or due to her own performance (internal attribution). In the 
attribution to social discrimination condition participants were told that the 
professor was known for grading male students better that female students and 
that other female students received a bad grade the last semester, too. In the 
external attribution condition the professor was described as arrogant and 
distracted while giving the feedback. Both manipulations followed those used by 
Schmitt and Branscombe (2002a; Study 2) and Major et al., (2003). In the 
internal attribution condition the person in the scenario was described as not 
well enough prepared and therefore, received a bad grade due to her poor 
performance. 
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After having read the vignette, the participants completed a questionnaire 
that included measures of anger, gender identification, and perceived 
illegitimacy as well as manipulation checks. Gender identification was assessed 
after the manipulation in order to avoid a social category becoming salient due 
to the assessment and triggering an attribution to social discrimination 
regardless of the experimental condition. Afterwards participants were 
thoroughly debriefed, thanked, and given their chocolate bar. 
 
Measures 
Anger. Participants rated the extent to which each item would represent 
their affective response to the negative feedback after the presentation 
described in the scenario. They had to indicate how they would feel in the 
described situation by using a 9-point scale (1 for does not apply at all to 9 for 
applies very much). Two types of anger were assessed. Self-directed anger 
was measured with four items (angry with myself, mad at myself, furious with 
myself, displeased with myself). The scale revealed a high internal consistency 
(α = .94). The other-directed anger scale consisted of the same four items 
directed at the professor (angry with the professor, mad at the professor, furious 
with the professor, displeased with the professor), likewise demonstrating a very 
good reliability (α = .95). Self- and other-directed anger did not correlate 
(attribution to social discrimination: r = -.07, N = 22, p = .75; external attribution: 
r = .10, N = 22, p = .67; internal attribution: r = .05, N = 23, p = .81). 
Social identification. Six items assessed the social identification with the 
group of women on a 7-point scale (1 for does not apply to 7 for does apply very 
much, e.g. “I identify myself with the group of women”, α = .76). These items 
were chosen from Luthanen and Crocker (1992; German version Bohner & 
Sturm, 1997) to assess social identification in a broad manner. 
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Manipulation checks. On a 7-point scale (1 for does not apply at all to 7 
for applies very much) participants were asked to indicate to what extent they 
would attribute the bad grade in the scenario to different causes, namely their 
gender (attribution to social discrimination), the professor (attribution to social 
discrimination and external attribution), and themselves (internal attribution). As 
an attribution to social discrimination includes both an external component, i.e. 
the prejudiced behavior of the perpetrator, as well as an internal component, i.e. 
the target’s group membership, both components should be high when 
attributing a negative feedback to social discrimination. According to Weiner 
(1995), attributing the outcome to a person is not the same as holding a person 
responsible for an outcome. He argues that even if the cause of an adverse 
event is located within a person and the cause is controllable by the individual, it 
is still possible that a judgment of responsibility will not be rendered if there are 
mitigating circumstances that negate moral responsibility. This is likely to 
happen when attributing a negative treatment to social discrimination due to the 
internal component of this attribution – the target’s group membership. 
Moreover, Weiner theorizes that it is the judgments of responsibility (and/or 
blame, in the case of negative outcomes) rather than judgments about the locus 
of causality (internal vs. external) that are the critical determinants of emotion. 
Thus, in order to check the attribution manipulation we asked for the 
responsibility of the group membership of the target, the perpetrator, and the 
personal performance of the target. 
Furthermore, illegitimacy was measured with a single item: “In your 
opinion, how legitimate is the fact that you would have received a C- for your 
presentation in the scenario?” (7-point scale, ranging from 1 for legitimate to 7 
for illegitimate). 
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2.5.2 Results 
Social identification 
In all three conditions social identification was well above the midpoint of 
the scale, indicating that the social category was meaningful (all ts > 5.29,  
all ps < .001). Social identification was higher in the internal attribution condition 
(M = 5.88, SD = .95) than in the external attribution condition (M = 5.08,  
SD = .96; post-hoc3: p = .04). The social discrimination condition did not differ 
from the other two conditions (M = 5.55, SD = 1.13; post-hoc: both ps > .33), 
F(2,64) = 3.49, p = .04. Thus, the social category was meaningful to the 
participants, and the social identification differed significantly, but only to a small 
extent, between the external and internal attribution condition. 
 
Manipulation checks 
In order to check for the impact of the manipulation, participants were 
asked to indicate the extent to which they would attribute the negative feedback 
in the scenario to different causes. As intended, participants regarded their 
gender as the reason for the negative feedback to be more important in the 
attribution to social discrimination condition than in the other two conditions 
(post-hoc: both ps < .001; attribution to social discrimination: M = 5.00,  
SD = 1.58; external attribution: M = 2.00, SD = 1.18; internal attribution: 
M = 1.13, SD = .63), F(2,62) = 63.69, p < .001. The means between the 
external and internal attribution condition differed marginally (p = .06). 
Furthermore, the professor was regarded as more responsible for the negative 
feedback in the attribution to social discrimination and external attribution 
condition than in the internal attribution condition (post-hoc: both ps < .001; 
attribution to social discrimination: M = 5.82, SD = 1.56; external attribution: 
M = 5.91, SD = 1.02; internal attribution: M = 2.48, SD = 1.83), F(2,63) = 9.72, 
                                                 
3 All reported post-hoc tests are Scheffé-tests. 
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p < .001. This reveals, as intended, the external component of an attribution to 
social discrimination. Moreover, the self was indicated to be more responsible 
for the feedback in the internal attribution condition compared to the other two 
conditions (post-hoc: both ps < .03; internal attribution: M = 5.04, SD = 2.38; 
attribution to social discrimination: M = 3.29, SD = 1.71; external attribution:  
M = 2.73, SD = 1.20), F(2,64) = 37.75, p < .001.  
The perceived illegitimacy of the negative feedback did not differ 
between the attribution to social discrimination (M = 5.96, SD = 1.40) and the 
external attribution condition (M = 6.00, SD = 1.07; post-hoc: p = .99). However, 
as intended, perceived illegitimacy did differ between these two conditions and 
the internal attribution condition (M = 2.44, SD = 1.80; post-hoc: both ps < .001), 
F(2,64) = 44.41, p < .001. 
Overall, these results demonstrate that the manipulation of the three 
types of attribution regarding the cause for the negative treatment elicited the 
corresponding attributions. As intended, the results reflect that the negative 
feedback in the scenario is perceived to be illegitimate only following either an 
attribution to social discrimination or an external attribution. 
 
Anger 
To test the impact of Attribution (attribution to social discrimination vs. 
external attribution vs. internal attribution) on both types of anger, separate 
multiple regression analyses were conducted with Identification and the 
Attribution x Identification interaction as additional predictors. Following Aiken 
and West (1991) the interaction terms were computed by a multiplication of the 
z-standardized identification score with two unweighted effect codes of the 
attribution variables (1st contrast: -1 attribution to social discrimination,  
0 external attribution, and 1 internal attribution; 2nd contrast: 0 attribution to 
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social discrimination, -1 external attribution, and 1 internal attribution). A 
hierarchical regression was computed. The two contrasts and Social 
Identification were entered in the first step, the interaction terms in the second 
step. This procedure was chosen to compute a joint test for the two interaction 
terms (i.e. a R² change test). All regression weights reported below stem from 
the final equation (see Table 1 and 7). 
We predicted that self-directed anger would be higher in the internal than 
in the other two conditions. Furthermore, we expected that higher levels of 
social identification would lead to a decrease in self-directed anger in the 
attribution to social discrimination condition, but neither in the external nor in the 
internal attribution condition. The regression analysis with self-directed anger as 
criterion variable revealed a main effect of Attribution (1st contrast: β = .20,  
p = .04; 2nd contrast: β = .63, p < .001). As expected, a higher level of self-
directed anger was found in the internal attribution condition (M = 7.47,  
SD = 1.31) compared to the two other conditions (attribution to social 
discrimination: M = 4.22, SD = 2.27; external attribution: M = 2.88, SD = 1.56) 
(see Figure 2). Furthermore, Identification did not influence self-directed anger, 
β = -.12, p = .13. 
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Figure 2: Mean self- and other-directed anger (standard deviations in brackets) 
as a function of type of attribution to negative feedback (Study 1). 
Most importantly, the expected Attribution x Identification interaction 
emerged, R² change = .04, F(2, 61) = 3.22, p = .05. As predicted, simple slope 
analyses (following Aiken & West, 1991) indicated that in the attribution to social 
discrimination condition higher identification led to a decrease in self-directed 
anger (β = -.40, p = .01), whereas in the external (β = -.04, p = .75) or in the 
internal attribution condition (β = .08, p = .59) identification did not have an 
impact on self-directed anger (see Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Self-directed anger as a function of group identification and type of 
attribution (Study 1). 
The multiple regression with other-directed anger as criterion variable 
revealed the expected main effect of Attribution (1st contrast: β = -.46, p < .001; 
2nd contrast: β = -.47, p < .001) such that other-directed anger was higher in 
the external (M = 7.11, SD = 1.72) and in the attribution to social discrimination 
condition (M = 7.09, SD = 2.24) than in the internal attribution condition  
(M = 1.99, SD = 1.30). Neither Identification (β = .04, p = .611) nor the 
Attribution x Identification interaction had an impact on other-directed anger,  
R² change = .01, F(2,61) = .57, p = .57. 
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Table 1: Standardized regression weights (β), unstandardized regression 
weights (B), and standard errors (SE) from multiple regressions of self-
directed anger (SDA) and other-directed anger (ODA) on attribution 
and social identification in Study 1 (N = 67). 
 SDA ODA 
 β B SE β B SE 
Attribution1 contrast 
(social -1, external 0, 
internal 1) 
 .20*  .64  .29 -.46*** -1.70  .32 
Attribution2 contrast 
(social 0, external -1, 
internal 1) 
 .63*** 1.98  .29 -.47*** -1.72  .32 
Identification 
 
-.12 -.33  .21  .04  .12  .23 
Attribution1 x 
Identification 
 .23*  .73  .30  .03  .13  .32 
Attribution2 x 
Identification 
-.06 -.21  .30  .06  .21  .32 
Note: *: p < .05, **: p < .01 
 
2.5.3 Discussion 
Both main effects of attribution on self-directed and other-directed anger 
reveal that (a) anger with oneself is experienced strongest in the internal 
attribution condition, and that (b) anger at someone else is expressed most in 
the attribution to social discrimination and the external attribution condition. As 
suggested in the Introduction, these results illustrate that the direction of anger 
aims at the perceived cause of negative feedback. 
As expected, the type of attribution moderated the impact of social 
identification on self-directed anger. Only when receiving negative feedback due 
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to their group membership, but not due to an external or internal cause, 
individuals with stronger social identification showed lower levels of self-directed 
anger. Hence, social identification buffered the impact of social discrimination 
for individuals highly identified with their group. It is not the group membership 
per se that buffers the negative effects after social discrimination but the 
identification with the group. This can be concluded from the finding that 
individuals with low group identification show the same level of self-directed 
anger as individuals who believe they caused the negative feedback 
themselves (see Figure 1). These results are contradictory to McCoy’s and 
Major’s position (2003) but support the prediction of Branscombe and 
colleagues (1999) concerning depression. 
This study had a minor limitation. The social identification should not 
differ as a function of condition, but female participants identified stronger in the 
internal compared to the external attribution condition. This result is likely to be 
influenced by the German wording of ‘professor’, implying that the professor 
was a man. Thus, this instruction may have made gender categorization salient 
and the participants might have used this salient category to restore their self-
esteem (e.g., Gaertner, Sedikides, & Graetz, 1999). Therefore, social 
identification may have been higher in the internal attribution condition. 
Consequently, in Study 2 the group membership of the person in the scenario 
was not made salient in the external and internal attribution condition.
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2.6 Study 2 
In order to rule out the minor weakness of Study 1, another social 
category (social identification with the University of Jena) and domain 
(internships) were chosen for the scenario. Furthermore, Study 2 aimed to 
replicate the impact of the attribution of negative feedback on the direction of 
anger and the moderating role of the impact of social identification on self-
directed anger. 
 
2.6.1 Method 
Design and sample 
Replicating Study 1, Study 2 had three conditions (attribution to social 
discrimination vs. external attribution vs. internal attribution). Again social 
identification was assessed as independent and self- and other-directed anger 
as dependent variables. Undergraduates of the University of Jena (65 women, 
29 men; age: M = 21, range: 18-29) were recruited on campus. Participants 
were compensated for their participation with a bar of chocolate. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure and materials were the same as in Study 1 except for two 
alterations. First, the salient group membership in the attribution to social 
discrimination condition was the affiliation with the University of Jena. During 
the time of the study there was an actual ongoing debate on introducing a group 
of so-called ‘elite-universities’ in Germany, a group of universities similar to the 
Ivy League Colleges in the United States. According to the debate, the 
University of Jena would not have been part of the elite group. In turn, this might 
reduce the status of the participants’ university and might make getting 
internships and jobs harder in the future. 
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Secondly, the negative feedback in the Study 2 scenario was the 
rejection of an application for an internship. In all three conditions the 
participants had to read a scenario and than imagine being the student in the 
scenario applying for an internship. The described student participated in a 
telephone interview with a human resource manager of a company. After the 
interview the student received negative feedback (i.e. the human resource 
manager rejected them). This feedback was described in a way that made it 
obvious that it was a result either of their affiliation to the University of Jena 
(attribution to social discrimination), or of the unfair behavior of the human 
resource manager (external attribution), or of their own performance (internal 
attribution). In the attribution to social discrimination condition the participants 
read that the human resource manager was known to prefer students from 
famous universities and that two students from famous universities were offered 
an internship, whereas a friend of the University of Jena was rejected as well. In 
the external attribution condition the human resource manager was described to 
be arrogant and distracted. In the internal condition the student in the scenario 
was described as not having performed well in the interview. In this study the 
sex of the human resource manager was not mentioned and could not be 
concluded from the wording. 
 
Measures 
Anger. The same anger scales as in Study 1 were administered. Both 
had a very good internal consistency (self-directed anger: α = .95; other-
directed anger: α = .93) and did not correlate in the social discrimination  
(r = -.22, N = 32, p = .24) and the external attribution condition (r = -.25, N = 31, 
p = .18) but did correlate in the internal attribution condition (r = .47, N = 31,  
p = .01). 
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Social identification. Identification was assessed by adapting the scale 
from Study 1 for social identification with the University of Jena revealing a high 
internal consistency (α = .83). 
Manipulation checks. Participants rated the extent to which they would 
attribute the rejection concerning an internship in the scenario to different 
causes: their university affiliation (attribution to social discrimination), the human 
resource manager (attribution to social discrimination and external attribution), 
themselves (internal attribution). According to Study 1, illegitimacy was 
assessed with one item. 
 
2.6.2 Results 
Social identification 
Social identification was above the midpoint of the scale in all three 
conditions (all ts > 4.02, all ps < .001) and did not differ between conditions 
(attribution to social discrimination: M = 4.80, SD = 1.06; external attribution:  
M = 4.94, SD = 1.16; internal attribution: M = 4.89, SD = 1.23), F(2,91) = .13,  
p = .881. Hence, the social category was meaningful and the alteration ruled out 
the weakness of Study 1. 
 
Manipulation checks 
As intended, participants attributed the negative feedback more to their 
university affiliation in the attribution to social discrimination condition than in the 
other two conditions (post-hoc: both ps < .001; attribution to social 
discrimination: M = 5.60, SD = 1.41; external attribution: M = 1.65, SD = 1.25; 
internal attribution: M = 1.10, SD = .31), F(2,90) = 154.97, p < .001. The means 
did not differ between the external and the internal attribution condition (p = .17). 
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Moreover, the human resource manager was regarded as more responsible for 
the negative feedback in the external than in the attribution to social 
discrimination and the internal attribution condition (external attribution:  
M = 4.84, SD = 1.77; attribution to social discrimination: M = 2.90, SD = 1.75; 
internal attribution: M = 1.84, SD = 1.16; post-hoc-test: all ps <. 03),  
F(2,91) = 28.49, p < .001. Finally, one was personally seen to be more 
responsible in the internal attribution condition compared to the two other 
conditions (post-hoc: both ps < .001; internal attribution: M = 5.90, SD = 1.27; 
attribution to social discrimination: M = 2.38, SD = 1.45; external attribution:  
M = 3.00, SD = 1.41), F(2,91) = 57.89, p < .001. The other comparison was not 
significant (p = .21). 
The perceived illegitimacy of the negative feedback differed in the 
intended way between the conditions (attribution to social discrimination:  
M = 5.72, SD = 1.44; external attribution: M = 5.16, SD = 1.32; internal 
attribution: M = 3.29, SD = 1.66, F(2,91) = 23.16, p < .001). The behavior of the 
human resource manager was perceived as more illegitimate in the attribution 
to social discrimination and in the external attribution condition than in the 
internal one (both ps < .001), whereas the attribution to social discrimination 
and the external attribution condition did not differ (p = .33). This pattern 
replicates the findings of Study 1 in showing that negative treatment is 
perceived to be illegitimate only when resulting from an attribution to social 
discrimination or an external attribution. 
 
Anger 
In separate multiple regressions (see Table 2 and 7) self- and other-
directed anger were regressed on the Attribution (attribution to social 
discrimination vs. external attribution vs. internal attribution), Social 
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Identification, and the Attribution x Identification interaction. The attribution 
variables were coded and the interaction terms computed as in Study 1. 
We predicted self-directed anger to be higher in the internal attribution 
condition compared to the other two conditions. Furthermore, we expected that 
stronger social identification would result in less self-directed anger in the 
attribution to social discrimination condition, but that this should not be the case 
neither in the external nor in the internal attribution condition. As expected, the 
main effect of Attribution occurred (1st contrast: β = .52, p < .001; 2nd contrast: 
β = .40, p < .001) such that self-directed anger was larger in the internal 
attribution condition (M = 7.10, SD = 1.62) compared to the other conditions 
(attribution to social discrimination: M = 2.47, SD = 1.84; external attribution:  
M = 2.82, SD = 1.51) (see Figure 4). Social Identification did not have a main 
effect on self-directed anger, β = .01, p = .88. 
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Figure 4: Mean of self- and other-directed anger (standard deviations in 
brackets) as a function of type of attribution to negative feedback 
(Study 2). 
Consistent with my prediction, the analysis revealed a significant 
Attribution x Identification interaction [R² change = .03, F(2,88) = 3.90, p = .02]. 
In line with my reasoning, simple slope analyses indicated that social 
identification was negatively related to self-directed anger in the attribution to 
social discrimination condition, β = -.25, p = .04. This relation was neither found 
in the external attribution condition, β = .11, p = .11, nor in the internal 
attribution condition, β = .16, p = .11 (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Self-directed anger as a function of group identification and type of 
attribution (Study 2). 
The regression analysis on other-directed anger revealed, as expected, a 
main affect of Attribution (1st contrast: β = -.23, p = .04; 2nd contrast: β = -.23,  
p = .03). Higher levels of other-directed anger were found in the external 
attribution condition (M = 5.15, SD = 1.36) and in the attribution to social 
discrimination condition (M = 5.18, SD = 1.47) compared to the internal 
attribution condition (M = 3.33, SD = 1.87). Higher levels of social identification 
led to an increase in other-directed anger, β = .30, p < .001. The Attribution x 
Identification interaction was not significant, R² change = .01, F(2,88) = .34,  
p = .72. 
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Table 2: Standardized regression weights (β), unstandardized regression 
weights (B), and standard errors (SE) from multiple regressions of self-
directed anger (SDA) and other-directed anger (ODA) on attribution 
and social identification in Study 2 (N = 94). 
 SDA ODA 
 β B SE β B SE 
Attribution1 contrast 
(social -1, external 0, 
internal 1) 
 .52*** 1.69  .24 -.23* -.64  .30 
Attribution2 contrast 
(social 0, external -1, 
internal 1) 
 .40*** 1.30  .24 -.23* -.67  .31 
Identification 
 
 .01  .03  .17  .30***  .71  .22 
Attribution1 x 
Identification 
 .21**  .68  .25  .01  .02  .32 
Attribution2 x 
Identification 
-.08 -.27  .24  .07  .20  .31 
Note: *: p < .05, **: p < .01 
 
2.6.3 Discussion 
The results of this study replicated the findings of Study 1. Self-directed 
anger was larger when negative feedback was attributed internally than when it 
was attributed either to social discrimination or externally. Moreover, other-
directed anger showed higher means in the attribution to social discrimination 
and in the external attribution condition than in the internal one. Furthermore, 
the study replicated the Attribution x Identification interaction: Stronger social 
identification led to less self-directed anger when negative feedback was 
attributed to social discrimination but not when it was attributed to the unfair 
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behavior of someone else or to personal performance. Together with the results 
of Study 1, these findings clearly support the hypothesis that higher social 
identification leads to a decrease in self-directed anger when attributing 
negative feedback to social discrimination. 
Study 2 ruled out the weakness of Study 1 so that the social identification 
did not differ between conditions. The chosen scenario in this study did not 
initiate stereotypic behavior. 
Apart from the expected effects, higher identification also led to an 
increase in other-directed anger. This effect was not found in Study 1 and thus 
seems to be specific for the current context. Concerning internships students 
are dependent on human resource managers. Thus, identification with the 
university and the student body might increase anger towards the human 
resource manager. 
The first two studies were correlational and hence do not allow to draw 
any conclusions concerning causality. Furthermore, social identification was 
measured after the manipulation. To be able to draw causal conclusions, a third 
study aimed to replicate the Attribution x Identification interaction on self-
directed anger using a cross-lagged design. 
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2.7 Study 3 
In order to test whether larger self-directed anger leads to a decrease in 
social identification or whether higher social identification leads to a decrease in 
self-directed anger, a third study with a cross-lagged design was conducted. 
This study aimed at showing that social identification prior to experiencing 
discrimination reduces self-directed anger resulting from social discrimination  
– and not the other way around. 
Three alterations were made in Study 3. First, the internal attribution 
condition was not included in Study 3 (it served only as a control condition in 
Study 1 and 2). Hence, the design was restricted to two conditions: attribution to 
social discrimination versus external attribution. 
Second, social identification and self-directed anger were assessed at 
two measurement points, before and after the manipulation. 
Third, social identification was measured in a more differentiating manner. 
Tajfel (1981) defined social identification as “that part of an individual’s self-
concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group 
(or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that 
group membership” (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255). According to Tajfel’s (1978) definition 
social identification with one’s group does not only include an affective 
component (the value and emotional significance attached to the membership) 
but also a cognitive component (the importance of the group to the self-
definition). The identification measure in my studies was one scale comprising 
items assessing mainly the affective as well as the cognitive component of 
social identification. 
However, research has shown that these components are distinct and 
predict different aspects of intergroup behavior (e.g., Ashmore, Deaux, & 
McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Tropp & Wright, 2001; Ellemers, Kortekaas, & 
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Ouwerkerk, 1999; Deaux, 1996). According to McCoy and Major (2003) it is the 
cognitive component of social identification – the extent to which the self 
subjectively overlaps with the group – that moderates the affective responses to 
perceiving social discrimination against oneself. Further evidence for a specific 
impact of the cognitive component of social identification stems from Sellers 
and Shelton (2003). They found that racial centrality - the extent to which being 
African American is central to the respondent’s definition of themselves (i.e. the 
cognitive component of social identification) - is positively associated with the 
extent to which individuals indicate having experienced discrimination. At the 
same time, the meaning and affect associated with one’s racial group seem to 
protect individuals from the impact of social discrimination on psychological 
distress. These results illustrate that different dimensions of racial identity seem 
to serve both as a risk factor for perceiving social discrimination and as a 
protective factor against the deleterious impact of social discrimination on 
psychological distress. Therefore, measures assessing the cognitive and 
affective component of social identification separately were included in Study 3. 
 
2.7.1 Method 
Design and sample 
A study with two conditions (attribution to social discrimination vs. 
external attribution) and social identification as a continuous independent 
variable was conducted. Following Study 1 and 2, self- and other-directed anger 
were assessed as dependent variables. Social identification and self-directed 
anger were assessed before and after the manipulation, other-directed anger 
only afterwards. Ninety-seven undergraduates of the University of Jena 
(Germany) participated in the study (62 women, 35 men; age: M = 23,  
range: 18-35). All participants received 5 Euro for compensation. 
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Procedure 
Participants were recruited for a series of unrelated experiments. After 
arriving at the lab, they first filled out a questionnaire with social identification 
and self-directed anger measures. Then the participants performed an 
unrelated lexical decision task that lasted approximately ten minutes. 
Afterwards they underwent the manipulation and received the questionnaire 
used in Study 2. 
 
Measures 
Anger. The anger measures were comprised of the same scales used in 
Study 1 and 2: self-directed anger (α t1 = .85; α t2 = .87) and other-directed 
anger (α t2 = .83). Other-directed anger could only be assessed at the second 
measurement point because at the beginning participants had not yet faced the 
source of negative feedback to which they could direct to their anger. Again 
self- and other-directed anger did not correlate (attribution to social 
discrimination: r = .15, N = 48, p = .31; external attribution: r = -.11, N = 49,  
p = .46). 
Social identification. The cognitive component of social identification was 
assessed with the four-item Importance to Identity subscale of Luthanen and 
Crocker’s (1992) Collective Self-Esteem Scale (7-point scale ranging from 1 for 
does not apply to 7 for does apply at all, e.g. “Being a student of the University 
of Jena is an important reflection of who I am.”, α t1 = .78; α t2 = .79). A 
shortened version of the social identification scale used in the first two studies 
was administered as a measure of the affective component .One item 
assessing the cognitive component was removed (α t1 = .80; α t2 = .76). 
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Manipulation checks. Participants again rated the extent to which they 
would attribute the rejection concerning the internship to different causes as 
well as the perceived illegitimacy of rejection. 
 
2.7.2 Results 
Social identification 
Both components of social identification neither differed between the two 
conditions nor between both measurement points (cognitive identification t1: 
attribution to social discrimination, M = 2.74, SD = 1.17; external attribution,  
M = 2.38, SD = 1.19; t2: attribution to social discrimination, M = 2.53, SD = 1.14; 
external attribution, M = 2.36, SD = 1.20; affective identification t1: attribution to 
social discrimination, M = 4.95, SD = 1.07; external attribution, M = 4.77,  
SD = 1.12; t2: attribution to social discrimination, M = 4.82, SD = 1.05; external 
attribution, M = 4.60, SD = 1.11), for both scales all Fs < 2.2, all ps > .14. 
Comparisons to the midpoint of the scale showed that the affective component 
of social identification was well above the midpoint, both ts > 3.76,  
both ps < .001, indicating that the category was meaningful for the participants. 
 
Manipulation checks 
As intended, the negative feedback was attributed to one’s group 
membership to a larger extent in the attribution to social discrimination condition 
than in the external attribution condition (attribution to social discrimination:  
M = 5.50, SD = 1.64; external attribution: M = 1.53, SD = 1.08),  
F(1,95) = 199.20, p < .001. Furthermore, the negative feedback was attributed 
stronger to the human resource manager’s behavior in the external attribution 
condition than in the attribution to social discrimination condition (external 
attribution: M = 5.02, SD = 1.36; attribution to social discrimination: M = 3.92, 
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SD = 2.20), F(1,95) = 8.86, p = .004. The attribution of the negative feedback to 
the self did not differ significantly between the conditions (attribution to social 
discrimination: M = 2.23, SD = 1.63; external attribution: M = 2.80, SD = 1.50), 
F(1,95) = 3.18, p = .08. 
Participants also had to rate the illegitimacy of the negative feedback. In 
both conditions the mean was above the midpoint of the scale, indicating that 
the feedback was indeed perceived to be illegitimate (both ts > 5.23,  
both ps < .001). The perceived illegitimacy was higher in the attribution to social 
discrimination condition (M = 6.38, SD = .89) than in the external attribution 
condition (M = 5.00, SD = 1.34), F(1,95) = 35.34, p < .001. This effect was most 
likely caused by the public discussion about the introduction of a similar group 
of elite-universities to the Ivy League in the United States. At the time of Study 2 
the discussion had just started and people were still suspicious and uncertain 
about this idea. At the time of Study 3 the discussion was on the media’s 
agenda and people started to develop their own opinion against the introduction 
of a group of elite-universities. There was a vivid and emotional discussion in 
the universities. So far there have not been big status differences between the 
universities in Germany; this educational reform will change this. This reflects 
why the scenario for the social attribution in Study 3 was perceived to be more 
illegitimate. 
Thus, the manipulation check concerning the attribution was in line with 
my intention and the negative feedback was perceived to be illegitimate. 
 
Anger 
Self- and other-directed anger did not differ between the conditions at 
both measurement points (self-directed anger t1: attribution to social 
discrimination: M = 2.41, SD = 1.63; external attribution: M = 2.17, SD = 1.51; 
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self-directed anger t2: attribution to social discrimination: M = 2.40, SD = 1.36; 
external attribution: M = 2.81, SD = 1.35; other-directed anger t2: attribution to 
social discrimination: M = 6.03, SD = 2.30; external attribution: M = 6.52,  
SD = 1.79), all Fs< 2.40, all ps > .10 (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Mean self- and other-directed anger (standard deviations in brackets) 
as a function of type of attribution to negative feedback (Study 3). 
In order to test the prediction that the type of attribution moderates the 
impact of the cognitive component of social identification at t1 on self-directed 
anger at t2, a multi-sample LISREL analysis (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1996) was 
formed. By this means, it is possible to assess whether the parameters of a 
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given path model are equivalent or different across different groups (i.e. in this 
study, the attribution to social discrimination condition versus the external 
attribution condition). In other words, using this method it is possible to test the 
prediction that social identification at t1 leads to less self-directed anger at t2 in 
the attribution to social discrimination but not in the external attribution condition.  
For each condition a path model with four latent variables, self-directed 
anger and social identification at the two measurement points, was computed. 
The path models were separately tested for the cognitive and affective 
component of social identification because the corresponding scales were 
expected to assess different components of social identification (t1: r = .24,  
p = .02; t2: r = .16, p = .13). In a first test all paths except for the one between 
identification at t1 and self-directed anger at t2 and the covariance between 
identification at t2 and self-directed anger at t2 were equated across both 
conditions. This path and the covariance were allowed to differ between 
conditions because they represent the predicted Attribution x Identification 
interaction on self-directed anger. The model with the cognitive component of 
social identification had an almost perfect fit: χ² (4, N = 97) = 1.88, p < .21; root 
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = 0.001; Goodness of Fit (GFI), 
Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI), Normed Fit Index (NFI), Comparative Fit Index 
(CFI) > .95. The model (see Figure 7) showed that higher identification at t1 
resulted in higher identification at t2 (β = .78, p < .001). Furthermore, 
identification and self-directed anger at t1 did not covary (ψ = .05, p = n.s.). Self-
directed anger at t1 lead to higher self-directed anger at t2 (β = .33, p = .05). 
Most importantly, higher identification at t1 lead to a decrease in self-directed 
anger at t2 in the attribution to social discrimination condition (β = -.26, p < .05) 
but not in the external attribution condition (β = .21, p = n.s.). This effect is in 
line with the prediction that social identification prior to receiving negative 
feedback will decrease self-directed anger after receiving negative feedback 
that is attributed to social discrimination and not externally. Self-directed anger 
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at t1 has no impact on social identification at t2 (β = -.01, ps = n.s.). 
Furthermore, social identification at t2 and self-directed anger at t2 did not 
covary to a significant extent in each condition but differed on a descriptive level 
in the expected direction (attribution to social discrimination: ψ = -.07, p = n.s.; 
external attribution: ψ = .13, p = n.s.). 
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Note: χ² = 1.88, df = 4, p < .21, RMSEA = 0.001 for multiple group comparison 
in which all paths were set equal between groups except for the relation 
between social identification t1 and self-directed anger t2 as well as 
identification t2 and self-directed anger t2. 
Figure 7: Structural equation model assessing both the direct and indirect 
effects of social and external attribution to negative feedback on social 
identification and self-directed anger. 
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In a second test the model with the cognitive component of social 
identification had the same restrictions as the first model. In addition, the path 
between social identification at t1 and self-directed anger at t2 was set equal 
between conditions. The resulting model had an unacceptable fit: χ² (5, N = 97) 
= 5.31, p < .02; RMSEA = 0.14; GFI = .95, NNFI = .82, NFI = .88, CFI = .93.  
A chi square difference test between the tested models revealed a significantly 
worse fit of the second model, ∆ χ² (1, N = 97) = 3.43, p < .05. 
The same analysis was computed for the affective component of social 
identification. In the test all paths except for the path between identification at t1 
and self-directed anger at t2 and the covariance between identification at t2 and 
self-directed anger at t2 were equated across both conditions. The resulting 
model had a poor fit: χ² (4, N = 97) = 3.58, p < .02; RMSEA = 0.16; GFI = .96, 
NNFI = .76, NFI = .88, CFI = .92. The affective component of social 
identification at t1 had no impact on self-directed anger at t2, neither in the 
attribution to social discrimination (β = -.01, p = n.s.) nor in the external 
attribution condition (β = .07, p = n.s.). Testing a saturated model did not result 
in significant paths for the predicted relation, either. 
 
2.7.3 Discussion 
These results replicate the findings of the first two studies and provide an 
insight in the causal relation of social identification and self-directed anger. The 
results support the prediction that higher identification results in less self-
directed anger in the attribution to social discrimination but not in the external 
attribution condition. When experiencing social discrimination, social 
identification only serves as a buffer for individuals highly identified with their 
group. However, self-directed anger does not have an impact on social 
identification. 
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It is the cognitive component of social identification - the importance of 
the group to the self-definition - that drives the found effect. The Attribution x 
Identification interaction was only found for the purely cognitive component of 
social identification and not for the purely affective component. This result 
seems to support McCoy and Major’s (2003) assumption that it is the overlap of 
the group with the self, or the centrality of the group for the self, that triggers the 
buffering effect of strong social identification. Furthermore, it also seems to give 
partial credit to Sellers and Shelton’s (2003) prediction that different dimensions 
of racial identity have a different impact on perceiving and responding to social 
discrimination. However, in their study the cognitive component of social 
identification did not impact on psychological distress. This might be due to the 
different types of variables (measures of racial centrality and psychological 
distress) they assessed. 
In all three studies the attribution to negative feedback was manipulated 
with different vignettes the participants had to read and imagine being in the 
position of the described person in the scenario. Study 4 aims to test whether 
the results also hold under the personal experience of negative feedback. 
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2.8 Study 4 
In order to extend my findings from the three scenario studies to 
situations people experience in their daily lives I conducted Study 4. Female 
participants had to recall a situation in which they received negative feedback 
due to either their gender, or another person’s inadequate behavior, or their 
own fault. 
 
2.8.1 Method 
Design and sample 
A study with three conditions (attribution to social discrimination vs. 
external attribution vs. internal attribution) and social identification as 
independent variable was conducted. Self- and other-directed anger were 
assessed as dependent variables after the manipulation. One-hundred and 
three female undergraduates of the University of Jena (Germany) participated in 
the study (age: M = 22, range: 18-30). All participants were compensated with 
two Euro. 
 
Procedure 
Female students were recruited for a study on personal experiences in 
receiving negative feedback. While recruiting participants no reference to their 
gender was made in order to make sure that the category did not become 
salient. They were asked to recall a situation in which they recently had 
experienced negative feedback. Depending on the experimental condition, 
participants had to describe a situation in which they had received negative 
feedback due to their gender (attribution to social discrimination), the unfair 
behavior of someone else (external attribution), or their own behavior (internal 
attribution). To make their personal experience more salient, participants had to 
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describe this situation on half a page and express how negative and illegitimate 
this feedback had been. 
After they had written down their experience, the participants had to fill 
out the questionnaire with the same measures as in Study 1-3. They were 
asked to indicate how they felt in the described situation. Finally, they were 
thoroughly debriefed and thanked. 
 
Measures 
Anger. The same anger scales were administered and both showed a 
very good internal consistency (self-directed anger: α = .91; other-directed 
anger: α = .89). Both anger scales did not correlate in any of the three 
conditions (attribution to social discrimination: r = .04, N = 34, p = .82; external 
attribution: r = .11, N = 37, p = .51; internal attribution: r = -.16, N = 33, p = .37). 
Social identification. The cognitive component of gender identification 
was measured as in Study 3 and revealed an acceptable internal consistency  
(α = .66). 
Manipulation checks. Participants rated the extent to which they 
attributed the experienced negative feedback to different causes, and indicated 
the illegitimacy of the experienced feedback. 
 
2.8.2 Results 
Social identification 
Social identification did not differ as a function of condition (attribution to 
social discrimination: M = 3.48, SD = 1.17; external attribution: M = 4.07,  
SD = 1.21; internal attribution: M = 4.00, SD = 1.26), F(2,99) = 2.39, p = .10. 
2 The impact of social identification 61
Manipulation checks 
Participants attributed the negative feedback stronger to their gender in 
the attribution to social discrimination condition than in the other two conditions 
(post-hoc: both ps < .001; attribution to social discrimination: M = 5.94,  
SD = 1.28; external attribution: M = 1.62, SD = 1.32; internal attribution:  
M = 1.39, SD = 1.32), F(2,101) = 131.59, p < .001. Moreover, the person who 
gave the negative feedback was ascribed more responsibility in the attribution 
to social discrimination and the external attribution than in the internal attribution 
condition (post-hoc: both ps < .001; attribution to social discrimination: M = 5.38, 
SD = 1.74; external attribution: M = 5.81, SD = 1.15; internal attribution:  
M = 3.58, SD = 1.68), F(2,101) = 20.41, p < .001. Furthermore, one’s own 
behavior was held more responsible for the negative feedback in the internal 
attribution condition compared to the other two conditions (post-hoc:  
both ps < .001; internal attribution: M = 5.13, SD = 1.66; attribution to social 
discrimination: M = 2.59, SD = 1.73; external attribution: M = 2.92, SD = 1.83), 
F(2,100) = 62.63, p < .001 (all other post-hoc tests p >.50). 
As intended, the perceived illegitimacy of the negative feedback did not 
differ between the attribution to social discrimination (M = 6.21, SD = 1.25) and 
the external attribution condition (M = 6.11, SD = 1.15; post-hoc: p = .96), but 
between these two conditions and the internal attribution condition (M = 3.64, 
SD = 1.80; post-hoc: both ps < .001), F(2,101) = 35.63, p < .001. 
Altogether, these results demonstrate that the new manipulation of the 
three different types of attribution elicited the intended attributions and 
perceptions of illegitimacy. 
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Anger 
As in Study 1 and 2, self- and other-directed anger were regressed in 
separate multiple regressions (see Table 3 and 7) on Attribution (attribution to 
social discrimination vs. external attribution vs. internal attribution), Social 
Identification, and the Attribution x Identification interaction. 
Self-directed anger was predicted to be larger in the internal attribution 
condition than in the both other conditions. Moreover, I expected that stronger 
social identification would result in less self-directed anger in the attribution to 
social discrimination condition, but not in the external nor in the internal 
attribution condition. In line with these hypotheses, the main effect of Attribution 
emerged (1st contrast: β = .35, p < .001; 2nd contrast: β = .17, p = .09), such 
that self-directed anger was larger in the internal attribution condition (M = 5.01, 
SD = 2.60) compared to the other conditions (attribution to social discrimination: 
M = 2.65, SD = 1.73; external attribution: M = 2.95, SD = 2.05) (see Figure 8). 
Social Identification did not impact on self-directed anger, β = -.03, p = .72. 
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Figure 8: Mean self- and other-directed anger (standard deviations in brackets) 
as a function of type of attribution to negative feedback (Study 4). 
Supporting my prediction, the analyses revealed a significant Attribution x 
Identification interaction [R² change = .07, F(2,96) = 4.23, p = .02]. As expected, 
simple slope analyses indicated that social identification was negatively related 
to self-directed anger in the attribution to social discrimination condition, β = -.33, 
p = .04. This relation was not found in the external attribution condition, β = -.08, 
p = .61. Surprisingly, there was a trend towards a positive relation between 
social identification and self-directed anger in the internal attribution condition, β 
= .31, p = .052 (see Figure 9). 
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Figure 9: Self-directed anger as a function of group identification and type of 
attribution (Study 4). 
In line with my expectations, the regression analyses on other-directed 
anger revealed a main effect of Attribution (1st contrast: β = -.24, p = .02; 2nd 
contrast: β = -.39, p < .001). Stronger other-directed anger was found in the 
external attribution condition (M = 6.17, SD = 1.98) and the attribution to social 
discrimination condition (M = 5.89, SD = 1.65) than in the internal attribution 
condition (M = 3.38, SD = 1.95). The Attribution x Identification interaction was 
not significant, R² change = .001, F(2,96) = .10, p = .90. 
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Table 3: Standardized regression weights (β), unstandardized regression 
weights (B), and standard errors (SE) from multiple regressions of self-
directed anger (SDA) and other-directed anger (ODA) on attribution 
and social identification in Study 4 (N = 103). 
 SDA ODA 
 β B SE β B SE 
Attribution1 contrast 
(social -1, external 0, 
internal 1) 
 .35*** 1.05  .31 -.24* -.66  .28 
Attribution2 contrast 
(social 0, external -1, 
internal 1) 
 .17  .49  .29 -.39*** -1.04  .27 
Identification 
 
-.03 -.08  .21 -.05 -.11  .20 
Attribution1 x 
Identification 
 .24*  .72  .31  .05  .13  .28 
Attribution2 x 
Identification 
 .04  .10  .30 -.03 -.07  .27 
Note: *: p < .05, **: p < .01 
 
2.8.3 Discussion 
The results of this study replicated the findings of the other scenario 
studies and extend them to personal, real life experiences. They show that 
social identification does not only protect individuals who have to imagine being 
an ingroup member experiencing social discrimination, but also individuals 
remembering a situation in which they were targets of social discrimination. 
Together with the results of Study 1-3, these findings clearly support the 
hypothesis that higher social identification leads to a decrease in self-directed 
anger when attributing negative feedback to social discrimination. 
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Apart from the expected effects, higher identification was positively 
related to self-directed anger when attributing negative feedback to one’s own 
behavior. This effect did not occur in the other studies and might be caused by 
the current paradigm. The female participants had to recall an experience of 
receiving negative feedback due to personal responsibility. It is likely that such 
situations are recalled more frequently in which the own gender legitimizes the 
negative feedback than situations in which personal responsibility is seen as the 
cause of the negative feedback because the former are more protective for 
one’s (personal) self-esteem. Results of another study indicate that high levels 
of social identification lead to an increase in self-directed anger when social 
discrimination is perceived to be more legitimate (see Study 5). 
 
2.9 Summary and discussion of Studies 1–4 
Studies 1-4 aimed at investigating the impact of social identification on 
affective responses to social discrimination by differentiating first between self- 
and other-directed anger, and second between an attribution to social 
discrimination and an attribution to external causes. The first aim of the present 
research was to show that the causal loci of attributions have differing impacts 
on the direction of anger. Negative treatment attributed to social discrimination 
and externally results in higher levels of other-directed anger compared to 
negative treatment attributed internally. Conversely, negative treatment 
attributed internally results in higher levels of self-directed anger compared to 
treatment attributed to social discrimination or externally. As to the second aim 
of this thesis, this series of studies demonstrated that the attribution of negative 
feedback moderates the impact of social identification on self-directed anger. In 
Studies 1, 2, and 4, an Attribution x Identification interaction revealed that 
stronger identification resulted in less self-directed anger after an attribution to 
social discrimination but not after an external or an internal attribution. This 
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effect was replicated in a cross-lagged design in Study 3, showing that the 
attribution was moderating the impact of identification (t1) on self-directed anger 
(t2) and not the other way around. Social identification led to less self-directed 
anger after an attribution to social discrimination, but not after an external 
attribution. The results were found both in scenario studies (Study 1-3) and in a 
study using the recollection of personal negative experiences (Study 4). The 
results of the first four studies yield strong support for the hypothesis that strong 
social identification protects the self when attributing a negative treatment to 
social discrimination. This effect was found when the negative treatment was 
perceived to be unfair.  
The results of the first four studies support my argument that is in line 
with Schmitt and Branscombe’s perspective (2002b; Branscombe et al., 1999), 
but they also give credit to McCoy and Major (2003). They support Schmitt and 
Branscombe’s prediction of self-protection for individuals highly identified with 
their group. According to Schmitt and Branscombe (2002a) it is the ‘group in the 
self’ that drives this effect. However, the negative effects of social discrimination 
are buffered only for highly identified individuals. This self-protective effect does 
not only buffer depressive mood, as has been shown in earlier research, but 
also anger toward the self. According to Crocker and Major’s (1989) argument, 
social discrimination does not inevitably have negative consequences for the 
self. This seems to be true, but only for highly identified individuals who are 
hence protected. The results were obtained with two different groups (women 
and University of Jena students). 
It could be argued that the effects observed here are limited to situations 
where one person only – and not the whole outgroup – is giving negative 
feedback to an individual due to that individual’s group membership. The latter 
case would be, according to McCoy and Mayor (2003), more global and thus 
more pervasive. Another item on attribution to the whole group was included in 
Study 3 in order to investigate the impact of perceived social discrimination by a 
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single person versus social discrimination the whole outgroup. The Attribution x 
Attribution-item interaction on self-directed anger was far from significant,  
β = -.04, p = .65, indicating that there is no moderating impact of whether the 
social discrimination is shown by a single person or by the whole outgroup. It 
seems, therefore, that it is not important whether social discrimination is shown 
by a single person or by the whole outgroup. Nevertheless, when facing social 
discrimination in our society, it is likely that the perpetrator operates alone rather 
than in the presence of other ingroup peers. 
The buffering impact of social identification was observed when the 
negative treatment was perceived to be illegitimate and the reason for that the 
target received this treatment was partly based in the perpetrator – the 
perpetrator’s prejudice. The question now arises as to how a target of social 
discrimination responds when facing an incidence of social discrimination which 
she/he perceives to be legitimate. In the following chapter this idea will be 
outlined further and hypotheses will be formulated and tested. 
 
 
 69
3 THE MODERATING EFFECT OF PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY 
 
In the previous chapter it was examined how an attribution to a negative 
treatment and social identification impact on self- and other-directed anger. In 
this case, a negative treatment that is perceived to be illegitimate and can be 
attributed to own group membership is called an incidence of social 
discrimination (i.e. Major et al., 2002). It is also possible that a negative group-
based treatment is perceived to be legitimate by the target (see p. 17). 
Therefore, this chapter will address the third aim of this thesis to study the 
impact of perceived legitimacy when experiencing a negative group-based 
treatment. Here the following will be discussed (a) where a negative group-
based treatment is perceived to be legitimate, (b) how this impacts on self- and 
other-directed anger, and (c) how in this case social identification influences 
self-directed anger. First, the concept of social discrimination will be discussed 
more precisely and further conclusions regarding the impact of perceived 
legitimacy of a negative group-based treatment on self- and other-directed 
anger will be drawn. 
 
3.1 The concept of social discrimination 
According to Major and colleagues (2002), a negative treatment is called 
social discrimination if it fulfils two criteria: (a) the negative treatment needs to 
be perceived as illegitimate by the target and (b) it is due to the target’s group 
membership. This definition includes only perceived illegitimate social 
discrimination.  
Similarly, Mummendey and Otten (2004) distinguish between 
differentiation and discrimination. The former describes differentiation as a need 
of individuals to differentiate between individuals based in their group 
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membership, because individuals look for a basis for orientations and decisions 
in their everyday lives (see also Self-Categorization Theory; Turner, Hogg, 
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Mummendey and Otten (2004, p. 312) 
further argue: “Discrimination between people is a problem because it is an 
inappropriate and unjustified differentiation between people because of their 
group membership. It is judgment and interpretation and not clear-cut ‘objective’ 
characteristics of the intergroup treatment itself which define instances of social 
discrimination.” Mummendey and Otten (2004) further elaborate on this 
definition and argue that differentiation changes into discrimination when two 
parties disagree about the legitimacy of a respective distribution and of the 
underlying categorization. According to them, dissent is a result of the 
perspective-specific evaluations of the group’s entitlement to specific shares of 
these resources. This is derived from the categorization which provided the 
basis of judging the above mentioned entitlement. More precisely, they assert 
that this dissent may exist between the perpetrators and targets or even 
between these two and other external observers. With this concept of social 
discrimination, Mummendey and Otten (2004) stress the role of social 
interaction between the perpetrator, the target, and other observers, as well as 
the resulting psychological processes. This definition also includes the two 
criteria of illegitimacy and group membership that define social discrimination as 
argued by Major and colleagues (2002). It further distinguishes between an 
incidence of social discrimination and of differentiation. 
Hence, cases of differentiation differ psychologically from cases of social 
discrimination in respect of the perceived legitimacy of this negative group-
based treatment. Incidences of differentiation are regarded as legitimate, 
whereas incidences of social discrimination are seen as illegitimate. The 
following section will summarize the research that has looked at the affective 
responses to differentiation from the target’s perspective. 
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3.2 Legitimizing ideologies and beliefs 
As mentioned earlier (see Chapter 1, p. 9), differentiation is still 
widespread in our society such as that minorities remain in part excluded from 
equal employment opportunities (e.g., in the United States see Braddock & 
McPartland, 1987; in Germany see Keck, 2004). Subsequently, different 
constructs are outlined that lead to a legitimate perception of an incidence of 
differentiation from the target’s perspective. Furthermore this impact on affective 
responses to this negative group-based treatment is discussed. 
Research on legitimizing ideologies in the field of social stigma has 
addressed this topic. Legitimizing ideologies are consensually shared attitudes, 
beliefs, and values that justify hierarchical and unequal relationships among 
groups in society (Sidanius & Pratto, 1993). More precisely, social dominance 
theory assumes that group-based inequalities must be legitimized in order to 
minimize intergroup conflict (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Pratto, 
Sidanius and their colleagues (Pratto et al., 1994, p. 747) argue that “societies 
minimize intergroup conflict by creating consensus on ideologies that promote 
the superiority of one group versus another. Ideologies that promote or maintain 
group inequality are the tools that legitimate discrimination. To work smoothly, 
these ideologies must be widely accepted within a society, appearing as self-
apparent truths (myths); hence we call them ‘hierarchy-legitimating 
myths’.“ According to social dominance theory, individuals differ in the extent to 
which they endorse group-based hierarchies and status differences. Those who 
are high in social dominance orientation are likely to endorse a legitimizing 
ideology to maintain or even to enhance these hierarchies. These individuals 
will further support social policies and political positions in the field of intergroup 
relations in general that are against improving the position of disadvantaged 
groups. Some scholars have long argued that one possibility of how members 
of high-status groups maintain the social hierarchical order is by encouraging 
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lower status groups to endorse the legitimizing ideologies that foster this “false 
consciousness” (e.g., Jost, 1995; Jost & Major, 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).  
Legitimizing ideologies lead to the perception that an experienced 
negative group-based treatment is seen as legitimate by the target. By ascribing 
the causality of, for example, the individual’s group status within the individual, 
legitimizing ideologies encourage the perception that this status is deserved. 
They lead the disadvantaged to blame themselves rather than others for their 
situation (Jost & Major, 2001). According to Mummendey and Otten (2004), 
endorsing a legitimizing ideology will lead to negative group-based treatments 
being perceived as a legitimate incidence of differentiation. In contrast, the 
disadvantaged who do not endorse a legitimizing ideology will, for example, not 
accept an unequal status and thus, not blame themselves but others for their 
situation. Therefore, this will lead to the negative group-based treatment being 
attributed to social discrimination. Specific examples for a legitimizing ideology 
from the perspective of the target are the belief of personal control (Crandall, 
1994; Crocker et al., 1993), the belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980; Lerner & 
Miller, 1978), and the legitimizing myth of stereotypes of social groups (Crocker 
et al., 1998; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2002). Following, these three 
legitimizing ideologies which are relevant in this context are briefly explained 
from the target’s perspective, before drawing conclusion on the difference 
between attributing a negative group-based treatment to differentiation versus 
social discrimination on anger. 
 
The belief of personal control 
The belief that people have control over their outcomes implies that they 
are responsible for them (Weiner, 1995). Some stigmatizing attributes, such as 
obesity, are judged to be more controllable and changeable than other 
stigmatizing attributes, such as gender. Individuals who have a controllable 
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stigma are judged as more responsible and blameworthy than those who 
possess a less controllable stigma (Weiner, 1995; Weiner et al., 1988; see also 
Chapter 1, p. 15). The belief in personal control has implications for how the 
stigma affects social interactions (Jones et al., 1984). Crocker and Major (1994) 
aussume that the stigmatized sometimes believe that a negative treatment they 
received based on their stigma is illegitimate, and sometimes they believe that a 
negative treatment is legitimate. Crocker and colleagues (1993) studied the 
attribution style of overweight women. They found that compared to standard-
weight women, overweight women were significantly more likely to attribute 
interpersonal rejection by a male partner to their weight, but were not more 
likely to attribute rejection to their partner’s personality or his concern with 
appearance. Crocker and Major (1994) argued that because weight is seen as 
controllable, overweight women perceived their rejection due to their weight as 
justified differential treatment rather than social discrimination. 
To conclude, if an individual has control over the own stigma, negative 
treatments are perceived to be legitimate. In the case of overweight women, the 
attribute ‘overweight’ as a result of the controllability is more an attribute related 
to the personal self than to the own group membership. More precisely, an 
overweight woman is rejected by a male partner due to her overweight and thus 
she attributes the rejection more to her weight than to the male’s concern with 
appearance. She has personal control over her weight and could start dieting, 
and thus loose the stigma. It is not her group membership that leads the partner 
to reject her. 
To conclude, the study of discrimination of overweight people is a study 
of personal negative treatment and not of negative treatment due to an 
individual’s group membership. Hence, the belief of personal control is not 
relevant for the context of this thesis where the affective response to a negative 
group-based treatment is under review. 
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The belief in a just world 
The underlying assumption of an individual who endorses a belief in a 
just world is that everything that happens is just and fair. This legitimizing belief 
can lead targets of social discrimination to except inequality and blame 
themselves, rather than others, for their experience of social discrimination 
(Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978). Three different lines of research suggest 
that believing one deserves one’s fate is sometimes preferable to concluding 
that one is a target of social discrimination. First, research has shown that 
women who are underpaid relative to men often believe that they deserve their 
lower salary and do not perceive that they personally are discriminated against 
(e.g., Major, 1987, 1989; Crosby, 1982; 1984; for a review see Taylor et al., 
1994). The second line of research examines people who have randomly and 
unpredictably become victims and blame themselves for the experience. For 
example, rape victims often blame themselves for the rape (e.g., Janoff-Bulman, 
1979). The third line of research gives more indirect evidence that victims of 
injustice are sometimes motivated to believe that their outcomes are fair (Hafer 
& Olson, 1989). Participants performed a computer task to win points toward a 
goal that had desirable consequences. All participants received bogus feedback 
telling them that they had not won any points. The results demonstrated that the 
stronger participants endorsed a belief in a just world, the stronger they 
perceived their own failure to win points to be fair. 
In sum, individuals differ in the extent to which they endorse beliefs that 
bias them to perceive the world as just or unjust, and that their outcomes are 
deserved or undeserved (e.g., Katz & Hass, 1988). Thus, targets who endorse 
a belief in a just world will perceive a negative group-based treatment as 
legitimate differentiation. In contrast, targets who do not endorse this belief will 
perceive a negative group-based treatment as illegitimate social discrimination. 
To conclude, to date this line of research has not distinguished between 
perceived legitimate differentiation versus perceived illegitimate social 
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discrimination. Thus, this line of research studies the impact of perceived 
legitimacy of a negative group-based treatment, and of social identification on 
anger. 
 
The legitimizing myth of social stereotypes 
Another type of legitimizing myth are stereotypes about social groups 
(e.g., Crocker et al., 1998; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2002). 
Stereotypes can help to maintain the inequalities between groups. Both positive 
and negative stereotypes can have this impact. Stereotypes do not only lead 
perpetrators to stigmatize other individuals due to their group membership (see 
also Chapter 1, pp. 14), but also influence the members of the stigmatized, 
stereotyped group.  
From the target’s perspective, positive and negative stereotypes, which 
the target to some extent agrees on with the perpetrators, are likely to shape 
the target’s perception of inequalities. For example, a positive stereotype of 
men being hard-working and ambitious may be as important in attaining and 
maintaining their leadership position at work as the negative stereotype that 
men are not really socially competent and empathetic. These positive as well as 
negative stereotypes may even be hard for the targets to resist.  
To sum up, individuals belonging to a group that is devalued due to an 
attribute of the group are stigmatized (Crocker et al., 1998; see also Chapter 1, 
pp. 14). Research has shown that these individuals tend to internalize the 
stereotype that is attributed to them (e.g., see stereotype threat, Steele, 1997). 
Thus, this internalization of stereotypes that others hold about oneself due to 
the own social stigma may lead to the belief that a negative group-based 
treatment is legitimate. More precisely, targets who internalize a stereotype of 
their group that fosters inequality will perceive a negative group-based 
3 The moderating effect of perceived legitimacy 76
treatment as legitimate differentiation, whereas targets who do not internalize 
the stereotype will regard a negative group-based treatment as illegitimate 
social discrimination. 
 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, the summarized research has studied the impact of the 
belief of personal control (Crandall, 1994; Crocker, Cornwell, & Major, 1993), 
the belief in a just world (Lerner, 1980; Lerner & Miller, 1978), and the 
legitimizing myth of stereotypes of social groups (Crocker et al., 1998; Jost & 
Banaji, 1994; Jost & Hunyady, 2002) on the target’s perceived legitimacy of a 
negative group-based treatment. First, research on the belief in personal control 
has studied the impact of a negative treatment on a personal level, and thus 
does not fit the aim of this thesis, which is to study the impact of a negative 
group-based treatment and of social identification on anger. Second, the belief 
in a just world has been studied as interindividual difference in this context, and 
is thus an important moderator in this field. Third, stereotypes play an important 
role in the research on the target’s response to a negative group-based 
treatment. Social stereotypes can legitimize a negative group-based treatment if 
the target has internalized the stereotype of the own group. In order to study 
differentiation as proposed by Mummendey and Otten (2004), the following 
criteria have to be fulfilled: the negative treatment (a) must be based on the 
target’s group membership and (b) needs to be perceived as legitimate by the 
target on the basis of the social stereotype of the own group. Research in the 
field of social discrimination and social identification has not yet investigated the 
impact of legitimizing ideologies on affective responses by focusing on 
legitimate perceived differentiation. 
So far the present research (Studies 1-4) only studied acts of social 
discrimination that were perceived as illegitimate by the target. On an 
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operational level three conditions were compared with each other in this thesis 
(see Table 4). An external attribution condition was included in which the 
negative treatment was manipulated to be (a) illegitimate and (b) not related to 
the own group membership (personal identity). Furthermore, this case was 
compared with an internal attribution condition which was perceived (a) to be 
legitimate and (b) not related to the own group membership (personal identity). 
Finally, an attribution to social discrimination condition was included which was 
perceived to be (a) illegitimate and (b) related to one’s group membership 
(social identity). This operationalization leaves out one further possible condition: 
an attribution to differentiation that is perceived to be legitimate.  
 
Table 4: Attributions varying along two dimensions: personal identity – social 
identity and perceived illegitimacy – legitimacy. 
 Illegitimate Legitimate 
Personal 
identity 
External 
attribution 
Internal 
attribution 
Social 
identity  
Attribution to  
social discrimination
Attribution to 
differentiation 
 
 
3.3 The impact of perceived legitimacy of a negative group-based 
treatment on self- and other-directed anger  
In line with Jost and Major (2001) and as a result of the impact of social 
stereotypes (Crocker et al., 1998), I expect that the experience of legitimate 
differentiation leads a target to blame her-/himself rather than someone else for 
the experience of a negative group-based treatment compared to the 
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experience of illegitimate social discrimination. Thus, differentiation will impact 
differently on self- and other-directed anger compared to the affective response 
to illegitimate social discrimination. 
Legitimacy main effect hypothesis on self-directed anger: 
Higher levels of self-directed anger should occur when facing 
differentiation compared to when the bad treatment is a result of social 
discrimination or the inappropriate behavior of the perpetrator. 
When being treated badly because of an incidence of legitimate 
differentiation, an individual is likely to regard the perpetrator as less 
responsible for the negative treatment compared to an incidence of illegitimate 
social discrimination. 
Legitimacy main effect hypothesis on other-directed anger: 
Other-directed anger should be smaller when attributing a negative 
treatment to differentiation compared to when attributing it to social 
discrimination or the inappropriate behavior of the perpetrator. 
 
3.4 The moderating effect of perceived legitimacy on social identification 
and self-directed anger  
Higher levels of social identification serve as a buffer against depressive 
mood for an individual facing social discrimination that is perceived to be 
illegitimate (e.g., Cross, 1991; Phinney, 1990, 1996; Branscombe et al., 1999). 
Studies 1-4 show that this buffering effect also impacts on self-directed anger: 
higher levels of social identification lead to less self-directed anger when facing 
illegitimate social discrimination. 
So far the impact of social identification on self-directed anger as an 
outcome of legitimate differentiation has not been studied. To develop a 
3 The moderating effect of perceived legitimacy 79
prediction about the interplay of differentiation and social identification, it is 
helpful to take a closer look at the definition of differentiation. In order to be 
called an incidence of differentiation a negative treatment must fulfil the two 
criteria: first, it must be attributed to the own group membership and second, the 
negative and unequal treatment must be perceived as legitimate because of the 
own group membership. For the case of differentiation the own group 
membership is causing that a target has to face a negative group-based 
treatment. The higher a group member is identified, the more the self (in this 
case the social self) is the cause of the negative treatment. Thus, the stronger a 
target identifies with the group due to which she/he is treated legitimately bad, 
the more this treatment will impact on the target and in turn, the more the target 
will be angry at oneself.  
Legitimacy-Attribution x Identification interaction hypothesis on  
self-directed anger: 
Stronger social identification leads to larger self-directed anger when 
attributing a negative treatment to differentiation (i.e. harming effect), 
whereas it will lead to lower levels of self-directed anger when attributing 
it to social discrimination (i.e. buffering effect). 
 
3 The moderating effect of perceived legitimacy 80
Table 5: Schematic presentation of the hypotheses of the moderating effect of 
perceived legitimacy and social identification on self-directed anger. 
 Illegitimate Legitimate 
Personal 
identity 
No effect No effect 
Social 
identity 
Buffering effect Harming effect 
 
In order to test the hypotheses an additional condition in which a 
negative group-based treatment was attributed to differentiation was included 
besides the previous attribution to social discrimination condition (Study 1-4).  
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3.5 Study 5 
Studies 1-4 found the buffering effect of social identification on self-
directed anger only when the negative treatment was attributed to an illegitimate 
act of social discrimination (i.e. behavior attributed to the own group 
membership). It is a moot question now whether social identification has also a 
harming impact on self-directed anger when facing differentiation that is 
perceived to be legitimate. Therefore, this study included an additional condition 
in which the participants read a scenario in which an ingroup member (a student 
who studies psychology as a minor) was not selected to participate in an 
interesting psychology seminar because the professor believes that she/he as a 
minor student has too little methodological and statistical knowledge to be able 
to follow the topic of the seminar. This manipulation was chosen to be able to 
compare the two conditions of a negative group-based treatment that differ in 
the perceived legitimacy: differentiation versus social discrimination. In both 
conditions the student was not selected due to the professor’s attitude with 
minor students. In the legitimate differentiation condition the professor’s 
stereotype about minor students was at least partially shared by the target (i.e. 
minor student) of the negative treatment. This manipulation was chosen to 
trigger a social stereotype of minor students. 
 
3.5.1 Method 
Design and sample 
Study 5 had three conditions (attribution to social discrimination vs. 
external attribution vs. attribution to differentiation). Social identification was 
assessed as independent factor and self- and other-directed anger as 
dependent variables. Undergraduates of the University of Jena (Germany) (31 
women, 16 men; age: M = 23, range: 20-27) studying psychology as a minor 
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were recruited in seminars for minor students. They were compensated for their 
participation with a bar of chocolate. 
 
Procedure 
The procedure and materials followed those of Study 1 except for two 
alterations. First, the salient group membership in the social discrimination and 
differentiation condition was the group of students who study psychology as 
minor.  
Secondly, the negative feedback in the scenario was the rejection of the 
participation in an interesting psychology seminar. In order to avoid that the 
group membership became salient, no reference to the belonging to the group 
of students who study psychology as a minor was made. Again, in all three 
conditions the participants had to read a scenario and than put themselves in 
the position of a student who is trying to get into a seminar. They had to imagine 
that they were trying to get a class-opener for an interesting seminar in 
psychology. They had to write a short email indicating their record of classes 
and their interest why they want to participate in this specific seminar. A couple 
of days later the person in the scenario in each condition received negative 
feedback (i.e. the professor rejected them to attend the seminar). The way the 
feedback was described let them think that it was a result of being a minor 
student (attribution to social discrimination), the inappropriate behavior of the 
professor (external attribution), or of being a minor student and thus, is believed 
to have a lack of methodological and statistical knowledge (attribution to 
differentiation). Following the instructions of Studies 1-3 in the attribution to 
social discrimination condition, the participants read that the professor is known 
to prefer students who study psychology as their major. The person in the 
scenario saw on a list on the black board that only major students were 
accepted, and heard that a friend who studies psychology as a minor was 
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rejected as well. In the external attribution condition the professor was arrogant 
and unconcentrated. In the legitimate differentiation condition the target person 
was not allowed to attend the seminar because she/he studied psychology as a 
minor and thus, the professor expected a lack in methodological and statistical 
knowledge. This wording was chosen to manipulate the social stereotype of 
minor students to have a lack of methodological and statistical knowledge as 
the cause for the rejection. In this condition the student was treated badly (i.e. 
rejected) based on the group membership that in turn was somehow legitimizing 
the negative treatment.  
 
Measures 
Anger. The same anger scales were administered and revealed a very 
good internal consistency (self-directed anger: α = .83; other-directed anger:  
α = .85). The both scales were negatively correlated in the attribution to social 
discrimination condition (r = -.57, N = 15, p = .03), no correlation emerged in the 
other two conditions (external attribution: r = .07, N = 15, p = .79; attribution to 
legitimate differentiation: r = .02, N = 16, p = .95). 
Social identification. Identification was assessed adapting the scale from 
Study 1 for the social identification with the group of students who study 
psychology as a minor. The scale had a good internal consistency (α = .79). 
Manipulation checks. Participants again rated the extent to which they 
would attribute the rejected class-opener in the scenario to different causes: 
their belonging to the group of students who study psychology as a minor, the 
professor, and themselves. In this study, illegitimacy was assessed with the 
same item used in the other studies that was reversed coded and another item: 
“How fair would it be, not to be allowed to attend this seminar?” (7-point scale 
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ranging from 1 = not fair to 7 = fair). The two items were collapsed into one 
scale showing a high correlation (r = .52; p > .001). 
 
3.5.2 Results 
Social identification 
Social identification did not differ between conditions (attribution to social 
discrimination: M = 2.94, SD = 1.33; external attribution: M = 2.45, SD = 1.17; 
attribution to differentiation: M = 3.30, SD = 1.30), F(2,44) = .31, p = .73. 
 
Manipulation checks 
Participants attributed the negative feedback more to their belonging to 
the group of students who study psychology as a minor in the attribution to 
social discrimination condition than in the other two conditions (post-hoc: both 
ps < .05; attribution to social discrimination: M = 6.25, SD = .77; external 
attribution: M = 3.93, SD = 2.19; attribution to differentiation: M = 4.81,  
SD = 1.60), F(2,44) = 8.20, p < .001. The means did not significantly differ 
between the external and the attribution to social discrimination condition  
(p = .33), but differed, as intended, on a descriptive level indicating that the 
negative feedback was stronger attributed to the group membership when 
facing a differentiation than when it was attributed to the professor’s 
inappropriate behavior. Moreover, as intended, participants stated in the 
attribution to social discrimination and external attribution condition higher 
scores for the responsibility of the professor for the negative feedback 
compared to the attribution to differentiation condition (posthoc-test: both  
ps <. 001; attribution to social discrimination: M = 6.06, SD = 1.18; external 
attribution: M = 5.60, SD = 1.30; attribution to differentiation: M = 3.00,  
SD = 1.46), F(2,44) = 24.92, p < .001. Finally, no difference was detected for 
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the own responsibility between all three conditions (attribution to social 
discrimination: M = 2.69, SD = 1.45; external attribution: M = 2.40, SD = 1.35; 
attribution to differentiation: M = 3.06, SD = 1.81), F(2,44) = .71, p < .50.  
The perceived illegitimacy of the negative feedback differed in the 
intended way between the conditions (attribution to social discrimination:  
M = 2.13, SD = 1.09; external attribution: M = 2.13, SD = .88; attribution to 
differentiation: M = 3.34, SD = 1.79, F(2,44) = 4.50, p = .02). The behavior of 
the professor was perceived as more illegitimate in the attribution to social 
discrimination and the external attribution condition than in the attribution to 
differentiation one (posthoc-test: both ps < .05), whereas the perceived 
illegitimacy did not differ between the first two conditions (p = 1.00). As intended, 
this pattern illustrates that differentiation due to a shared social stereotype of 
minor students in psychology is perceived to be more legitimate compared to 
social discrimination due to the prejudice of the perpetrator. 
 
Anger 
In separate multiple regressions (see Table 6) self- and other-directed 
anger were regressed on the Attribution (attribution to social discrimination vs. 
external attribution, vs. attribution to differentiation), Social Identification, Other-
directed Anger as covariate, Attribution x Other-directed Anger interaction, and 
Attribution x Identification interaction. The attribution variable was coded as in 
Study 1. The simple slopes were computed separately for the three conditions. 
Self-directed anger was expected to be higher in the attribution to 
differentiation than in the attribution to social discrimination and external 
attribution condition. Furthermore, it was predicted that stronger social 
identification would result in less self-directed anger in the attribution to social 
discrimination (replicating the findings of Studies 1-4), stronger social 
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identification would result in more self-directed anger in the attribution to 
differentiation but no impact in the external attribution condition. As expected, 
the main effect of Attribution emerged (1st contrast: β = .52, p < .001; 2nd 
contrast: β = .31, p < .001) such that self-directed anger was higher in the 
attribution to differentiation condition (M = 4.19, SD = 1.80) compared to the 
both other conditions (attribution to social discrimination: M = 1.70, SD = .64; 
external attribution: M = 2.58, SD = 1.54) (see Figure 10). Social identification 
had a main effect on self-directed anger, β = .36, p = .01. Furthermore, other-
directed anger was included as a covariate in the regression analysis that did 
not impact on self-directed anger, β = .01, p = .95. 
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Figure 10: Mean self- and other-directed anger (standard deviations in brackets) 
as a function of type of attribution to negative feedback (Study 5). 
Consistent with the prediction, the analysis revealed a significant 
Attribution x Identification interaction [R² change = .13, F(2,37) = 6.35, p = .004]. 
In line with the expectations, simple slope analysis indicated that social 
identification was negatively related to self-directed anger in the attribution to 
social discrimination condition, β = -.47, p = .03, whereas, this relation emerged 
the other way around in the attribution to differentiation condition: higher levels 
of social identification led to an increase of self-directed anger, β = .60, p = .02. 
Surprisingly, stronger social identification was positive related to self-directed 
anger in the external attribution condition, β = .65, p = .01 (see Figure 11). The 
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Attribution x Other-directed Anger interaction did not have an impact (both  
βs > .21, both ps > .16). 
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Figure 11: Self-directed anger as a function of group identification and type of 
attribution (Study 5). 
In line with the expectations, the regression analysis on other-directed 
anger revealed a main affect of Attribution (1st contrast: β = -.07, p = .67; 2nd 
contrast: β = -.40, p = .02), higher other-directed anger was found in the 
external attribution condition (M = 7.37, SD = 1.39) and the attribution to social 
discrimination condition (M = 6.48, SD = 1.46) than in the attribution to 
differentiation condition (M = 5.11, SD = 2.00). Furthermore, social identification 
was not related to other-directed anger, β = -.24, p = .17. We included self-
directed anger as a covariate in the regression analysis that did not impact on 
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other-directed anger, β = -.08, p = .64. The Attribution x Identification interaction 
was not significant, R² change = .001, F (2,37) = .001, p = .99. 
 
Table 6: Standardized regression weights (β), unstandardized regression 
weights (B), and standard errors (SE) from multiple regressions of self-
directed anger (SDA) on attribution and social identification in Study 5 
(N = 47). 
 SDA 
 β B SE 
Identification 
 
 .36**  .63  .19 
Attribution1 (social discrimination -1, 
external 0, differentiation 1) 
 .52** 1.09  .28 
Attribution2 (social discrimination 0, 
external -1, differentiation 1) 
 .31**  .04  .31 
Other-directed Anger (covariate) 
 
 .01  .01  .31 
Attribution1 x Other-directed Anger 
 
 .21  .45  .32 
Attribution2 x Other-directed Anger 
 
-.14 -.29  .33 
Attribution1 x Identification 
 
 .44**  .91  .26 
Attribution2 x Identification 
 
-.21 -.47   .28 
Note: *: p < .05, **: p < .01 
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3.5.3 Discussion 
The results support the prediction that lower levels of self-directed anger 
emerged when attributing a negative treatment to differentiation compared to 
when attributing it to social discrimination or the inappropriate behavior of the 
perpetrator. Furthermore, other-directed anger was smaller when attributing a 
negative treatment to differentiation compared to when attributing it to social 
discrimination or the inappropriate behavior of the perpetrator. These results 
illustrate that an attribution to differentiation impacts differently on the affective 
response than an attribution to social discrimination. 
Moreover, this study replicates the finding of Studies 1-4 for the buffering 
impact of social identification on self-directed anger when facing social 
discrimination that is perceived to be illegitimate. The results of Study 5 further 
illustrate the limits of this buffering effect of social identification. When facing 
differentiation, the relation between higher levels of social identification and self-
directed anger turned around: in this case stronger social identification lead to 
an increase of self-directed anger. When facing differentiation, the stronger the 
participants identified with the group of students who study psychology as a 
minor, the more they were angry toward the self. Again when attributing the 
negative feedback to the inappropriate behavior of the professor no such 
relation between social identification and self-directed anger emerged. 
These results clearly support the hypothesis (i.e. buffering effect) that 
only when a negative group-based treatment is perceived to be illegitimate (i.e. 
social discrimination) higher social identification serves as a buffer for the self 
and decreases the individual affective vulnerability. However, the results of this 
study illustrate that strong social identification can also increase the affective 
vulnerability of a target (i.e. harming effect) when facing a negative group-based 
treatment. This is the case when the negative group-based treatment is 
attributed to an incidence of differentiation which is perceived to be legitimate by 
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the target. In conclusion, strong social identification only protects targets of a 
negative treatment when they attribute the treatment to social discrimination.  
It is now questionable what is driving this harming effect of social 
identification on self-directed anger when attributing a negative group-based 
treatment to perceived legitimate differentiation. The stronger a target identifies 
with the own group, the stronger the target will belief to possess the stereotype 
due to which the target received the negative group-based treatment. This in 
turn is likely to impact on the perceived legitimacy of the negative group-based 
treatment in that way that the incidence of differentiation is regarded to be more 
legitimate. As a consequence, the stronger a target internalizes the stereotype 
(e.g., Steele, 1997), the more the target will blame her/himself to deserve this 
negative treatment (for a review see Taylor et al., 1994). Consequently, this will 
lead to an increase of self-directed anger. 
The predicament of stigmatized people is that they experience social 
discrimination frequently on a daily basis and severe across a wide range of 
situations (for an overview see Crocker et al., 1998). Research has shown that 
stigmatized people often believe that they deserve the treatment they receive 
from others and tend to blame themselves rather than others (for a review see 
Taylor et al., 1994). Endorsing these ideologies has been shown to be 
associated with better psychological functioning (Taylor & Brown, 1988; 
Tomaka & Blascovich, 1994). This line of research has so far not looked at the 
impact of social identification in this context. According to the results of the 
present study, the effect of better psychological functioning seems to be 
restricted to low identifiers who experience smaller self-directed anger. High 
identified targets show higher levels of self-directed anger when facing a 
negative treatment that can be attributed to differentiation.   
The belief that group boundaries are permeable and allow for individual 
mobility to improve the own status also impacts on the perception of and 
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attributions to social discrimination. Tajfel (1982) described the belief of 
individual mobility that group boundaries are permeable as a primary 
determinant of the behavior of disadvantaged groups. Individuals differ in the 
extent to which they endorse this belief. The stronger a target believes in 
individual mobility, the less the target attributes negative treatment to social 
discrimination (e.g., Major, Gramzow, McCoy, Levin, Schmader, & Sidanius, 
2002). Thus, if the group boundaries are permeable and a target of social 
discrimination endorses the belief of personal mobility, the individual is likely not 
to attribute a negative treatment to social discrimination and hence, take action 
against the personally experienced negative treatment – hopefully to foster 
social change. This line of research has studied the impact of social 
identification but has not yet studied the impact of perceived legitimacy between 
social discrimination versus differentiation 
To conclude, the aim of this study was to examine the impact of 
perceived legitimacy of a negative group-based treatment (i.e. social 
discrimination versus differentiation). This study filled a gap as discussed in 
previous research by studying the impact of perceived legitimacy of a negative 
group-based treatment and social identification on self-directed anger. 
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4 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Summary of the results 
The current research had three research goals on the agenda. Five 
studies aimed to examine the impact of the attribution of negative treatment (1) 
on self- and other-directed anger as affective response and (2) social 
identification on self-and other-directed anger. Finally (3) the impact of 
perceived legitimacy of a negative group-based treatment and social 
identification on self- and other-directed anger by distinguishing between an 
attribution to social discrimination and differentiation was studied. 
The first goal was addressed in Studies 1-4. The type of attribution of the 
negative treatment was predicted to impact differently on self- and other-
directed anger. In line with the prediction, a negative treatment attributed to 
social discrimination and to external factors results in higher levels of other-
directed anger compared to negative treatment attributed to internal factors. 
Conversely, a negative treatment attributed internally results in higher levels of 
self-directed anger compared to a treatment attributed to social discrimination or 
to external factors.  
Studies 1-4 addressed additionally the second goal, which was to study 
the impact of social identification in this context. The attribution of a negative 
treatment was expected to moderate the impact of social identification on self-
directed anger. The results revealed, as hypothesized, that stronger 
identification resulted in less self-directed anger after an attribution to social 
discrimination (i.e. buffering effect), but not after an external or an internal 
attribution. Study 3 set out to understand the causal direction of the effect: 
Social identification impacts on self-directed anger and not the other way 
around when attributing a negative treatment to social discrimination, but no 
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relation between both variables was found when attributing it to the 
inappropriate behavior of the perpetrator. Furthermore, the buffering impact of 
social identification on self-directed anger when facing social discrimination was 
found both in scenario studies (Studies 1-3) and could be extended to personal 
real life experience of social discrimination in Study 4.  
The third and final goal was addressed in Study 5. This set out to test 
whether the perceived legitimacy of a negative group-based treatment 
moderates the impact of social identification on self-directed anger. The results 
illustrate the limits of the buffering impact of social identification for the 
individual’s emotional vulnerability (see Studies 1-4). Only when a negative 
group-based treatment is attributed to social discrimination that means it is 
perceived to be illegitimate, strong social identification does serve as a buffer 
and lead to a decrease in self-directed anger. This impact is reversed if the 
negative group-based treatment is attributed to differentiation that is perceived 
to be legitimate. In this case, strong social identification harms the individual 
emotional vulnerability by increasing levels of self-directed anger. 
 
4.2 Results in light of previous research 
The current results are a step forward to resolving the controversy 
between Branscombe and colleagues (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1999) on the 
one hand and Major and colleagues (e.g., McCoy & Major, 2003) on the other.  
The results of the first four studies yield support for the argument that is in line 
with Schmitt and Branscombe’s prediction of self-protection for individuals 
highly identified with their group when experiencing illegitimate social 
discrimination (2002b; Branscombe et al., 1999). In contrast with this argument 
and the results of Studies 1-4, McCoy and Major (2003) argue that only low 
identified individuals are protected when facing an incidence of social 
discrimination. 
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A closer look at the previous findings on the impact of social 
discrimination and social identification on depressive mood (Branscombe et al., 
1999; McCoy & Major, 2003) might shed some light on and help to understand 
the contradicting results. Previous research has so far not paid attention to the 
legitimacy of negative group-based treatments. In this thesis, the investigation 
of the perceived legitimacy of a negative group-based treatment by 
distinguishing between social discrimination versus differentiation is a first step 
to better understanding the contrary assumptions and results of Branscombe 
and colleagues (1999) in contrast to McCoy and Major (2003). In the studies 
supporting the two contrary predictions different types of negative treatment 
were used to operationalize social discrimination. In order to compare both 
approaches, it is worthwhile to apply Kelley’s principles of attribution (1973). 
Branscombe and colleagues (1999) studied the experience of social 
discrimination across a variety of situations with different perpetrators in targets’ 
past, and in future hypothetical situations. On a list of described scenarios in 
which African-Americans are likely to face social discrimination, participants had 
to circle the percentage to which they would attribute the described negative 
treatment to social discrimination. The answers were collapsed into one 
measure. This operationalisation leaves open whether they have in fact studied 
incidences of social discrimination or differentiation. The authors themselves 
argue that they tested African-Americans because they tend to perceive race-
based social discrimination as illegitimate which would by definition rule out 
instances of differentiation (Major, 1994). 
According to Kelley’s theory of attribution three factors impact on a 
causal attribution. In the study of Branscombe and colleagues (1999), the 
consistency (i.e. the degree to which the target experiences that same negative 
group-based treatment from the perpetrator on different occasions) is high, 
because the items measure different contexts in which the perpetrator 
discriminates against African-Americans. The distinctiveness (i.e. the degree to 
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which the same perpetrator performs a negative group-based treatment with 
different targets) is not measured. The items did not measure whether a specific 
perpetrator discriminates against other African-Americans as well, the items 
asked for personal experiences. Even though the participants did not provide 
any information on the distinctiveness, it is likely that the participants assume on 
the basis of their own group membership that other ingroup members will 
experience the same negative group-based treatment (i.e. the distinctiveness is 
low). The consensus (i.e. the degree to which the target experiences a negative 
group-based treatment from different perpetrators) is high, because the items 
include different perpetrators discriminating against African-Americans.  
In sum, the target in this study (Branscombe et al., 1999) has faced a 
negative group-based treatment from the perpetrator on different occasions 
(high consistency), assumes that other ingroup member have to face this 
experience as well (low distinctiveness), and other perpetrators have treated the 
target badly due to the own group membership as well (high consensus). 
According to Branscombe and colleagues (1999), such an attribution to social 
discrimination is rather an internal (i.e. group membership) than external 
attribution (i.e. prejudice of the perpetrator) that will protect high identified 
targets. Thus, they have studied the experience of social discrimination across 
a variety of situations, with different perpetrator groups, and over time from a 
retrospective that will lead to different psychological consequences than 
studying the experience of a single incidence of social discrimination. For 
example, ‘chronically’ stigmatized often believe they deserve the inequity (see 
Chapter 3, p. 69; Taylor et al., 1994). This would not be the case for a single 
incidence of a negative group-based treatment, as discussed in the following 
paragraph. 
To begin with in contrast, McCoy and Major (2003) implemented the 
concept of ‘social discrimination’ with a different procedure. They studied the 
impact of the experience of ‘social discrimination’ for a single incidence in the 
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laboratory. All female participants received negative feedback by a prerecorded 
male voice on a short speech they had prepared. Prior to being asked to form 
an impression of the male evaluator, participants exchanged attitude 
questionnaires with him to facilitate impression formation. Depending on the 
condition, the female participants either learned that the evaluator was 
prejudiced against women or not. This operationalisation is different to that of 
Branscombe and colleagues (1999) in two respects. First, McCoy and Major 
(2003) studied a single incidence of ‘social discrimination’ which was likely to 
trigger different attributions. This manipulation lead to low consistency. Because 
of the single incidence, no further consistency information was given. Moreover, 
the distinctiveness and the consensus information were also not given in this 
context. As a result, the necessary information to generalize this experience 
was missing and did not amount to a stable attribution of social discrimination. 
Given the fact that the participants faced a single incidence, they attributed the 
negative treatment externally, i.e. to this specific man.  
Secondly, ‘social discrimination’ was manipulated by receiving negative 
feedback in a work-setting. This manipulation may have triggered the female’s 
attitude that she is not adept at this task. Research has demonstrated that 
women tend to underperform in several contexts where they have to face 
stereotype threat (e.g., leadership aspirations, Davies, Spencer, & Steele, 2005; 
intellectual ability and performance, Steele, 1997; math performance, Spencer, 
Steele, & Quinn, 1999). Therefore, the setting of the study may have been 
confounded by women believing themselves to underperform in this context. As 
a consequence, female participants might believe themselves as performing 
badly at this task and that they in turn deserve the negative feedback (i.e. at 
least partly legitimate negative feedback). Thus, this setting of the study might 
have manipulated differentiation rather than social discrimination according to 
Mummendey and Otten (2004). This would explain why these results of McCoy 
and Major (2003) show a similar pattern to the results in the differentiation 
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condition of Study 5: when facing a negative group-based treatment higher 
levels of social identification lead to higher levels of depressive mood.  
To conclude, both approaches differ in the employed operationalization. 
Branscombe and colleagues (1999) studied the impact of long-term social 
discrimination from a retrospective standpoint and McCoy and Major (2003) 
examined the impact of short-term differentiation, which therefore leads to 
different implications. Both examined the negative treatment due to own group 
membership. Both therefore fulfil the first criteria of a negative treatment as 
defined by Major and colleagues (2002) as an incidence of social discrimination. 
More importantly, these two approaches differ in the perceived legitimacy of the 
negative group-based treatment. Branscombe and colleagues (1999) 
investigated the impact of illegitimate acts, whereas McCoy and Major (2003) 
examined the impact of legitimate acts. Following this reasoning, the results of 
Study 5 indicate how the controversy between Branscombe and colleagues 
(e.g., Branscombe et al., 1999) on the one hand, and Major and colleagues 
(e.g., McCoy & Major, 2003) on the other might be resolved. 
 
4.3 Underlying processes 
This present research found convincing support for the Attribution by 
Identification interaction hypothesis on self-directed anger. Social identification 
was found to have a considerable impact in the context of social discrimination 
and differentiation. Here, notions concerning the underlying processes and a 
more precise analysis of the impact of different perpetrators will be discussed, 
and conclusions for future research then drawn. 
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The group as a source of social and emotional support 
A conclusion that might be drawn from the presented data is that by 
identifying strongly with a group, individuals are protected against self-directed 
anger only if the social discrimination was perceived to be illegitimate. Several 
other studies have also shown a positive relationship between social 
identification and well-being among members of stigmatized groups (e.g., 
Branscombe et al., 1999; Crosby, Pufall, Snyder, O’Connell, & Whalen, 1989). 
In line with these authors, I believe that social identification - the feeling of 
belonging to a group - has such positive effects because the ingroup serves as 
a source of social and emotional support. This in turn protects individual group 
members, irrespective of whether they are alone or with other group members, 
when they are faced with social discrimination. Up to date, research has not 
examined the cognitive underlying processes of this buffering effect of social 
identification. Further research should therefore investigate the determinants 
that trigger this effect. 
When a target perceives the negative group-based treatment as 
legitimate, social identification has the reversed impact on self-directed anger. 
In this case the harming impact of legitimate differentiation and social 
identification on self-directed anger (i.e. strong social identification increases the 
individual vulnerability), can be explained as follows. When facing differentiation, 
the own group membership is the cause for a target having to face this negative 
treatment. The target has internalized the group’s attribute, and it is due to this 
attribute that the target is discriminated against. The stronger a target is 
identified with her/his own group, the more the social self is the cause of the 
negative treatment. Furthermore, the target perceives the negative group-based 
treatment as legitimate, and thus is angry at the cause of the negative treatment 
– oneself (in this case the social self). Hence, the stronger a target identifies 
with her/his own group due to which she/he is treated legitimately bad, the more 
this treatment will effect the target and, following from this, the more the target 
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will be angry at her- or himself. This explanation has likewise not been tested 
empirically, and thus should be investigated in future research. 
 
Comparative processes 
An alternative possible process is that the perception and the appraisal 
(i.e. a central cause for affect) of an incidence of a negative group-based 
treatment might be different depending on the level of social identification. In 
line with the results when facing an incidence of social discriminination low 
identified individuals might have a more individualistic perspective on the 
situation. Therefore, they are likely to feel more responsible for the negative 
feedback, and in turn show higher levels of self-directed anger. Also, compared 
to highly identified individuals, low identifiers might compare themselves more 
on the basis of a temporal comparison with the self in other situations in the 
past. In contrast, high identified individuals are likely to compare themselves 
more on the basis of an intragroup comparison compared to low identified 
individuals (e.g., Kessler, Mummendey & Leisse, 2000; Postmes, Branscombe, 
Spears, & Young, 1999; Zagefka & Brown, 2005). Thus, high identified 
individuals might consider themselves as only one ingroup member facing this 
negative experience, and this would buffer negative affect because the 
intergroup comparison is not negative. 
These comparative processes seems to be different for a target facing an 
incidence of differentiation. Low identified individuals facing an incidence of 
differentiation show the same level of self-directed anger as low identified 
individuals facing an incidence of social discrimination. It is likely that low 
identified individuals for whom the group membership is not important and 
accessible hold a more individualistic perspective irrespectively whether they 
face an incidence of differentiation or social discrimination. More interestingly, is 
the comparative process of highly identified individuals. Highly identified 
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individuals facing an incidence of differentiation might believe that they deserve 
the negative treatment on the basis of the social stereotype of their ingroup. 
They might compare themselves more on the basis of intragroup comparison 
compared to low identified individuals. Even though, they might only experience 
one incidence of differentiation, they would believe that they deserve this 
treatment. Thus, this perception is likely to elicit high levels of self-directed 
anger. These assumptions for the comparative processes of low and highly 
identified individuals facing an incidence of social discrimination or 
differentiation has not yet been tested. Thus, further research should address 
this. 
 
The impact of personal versus social identity 
Moreover, the extent to which individuals identify with their ingroup 
impacts on the strength of their activated personal or social identity in a given 
context. For low identified individuals it is likely that their personal identity is 
more accessible than their social identity. For highly identified individuals this is 
likely to be the other way around: the social identity is more accessible than the 
personal identity. As a consequence, individuals will perceive the negative 
treatment differently depending on their salient identity. According to relative 
deprivation theory (e.g., Crosby, 1976; 1982; Runciman, 1966; Stouffer et al., 
1949), individuals show different responses depending on whether deprivation 
is occurring at the individual or group level (Smith & Oritz, 2002). In line with the 
reasoning in the previous paragraph, low and highly identified individuals do not 
only differ in their comparisons. Whether the personal or social identity is more 
accessible influences the target’s perception of the situation, and each will lead 
to different responses. Low identified individuals are likely to choose individual 
strategies, whereas highly identified individuals tend to chose collectice 
strategies (for a further discussion see p. 102). 
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The sociofunctional threat-based approach to ’prejudice’ 
To date, research has not examined the impact of different groups 
discriminating against a target group. More recently, the sociofunctional threat-
based approach to ‘prejudice’ (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005) suggests 
distinguishing emotional responses to different groups. In their study Cottrell 
and Neuberg (2005) demonstrated that different social groups elicited different 
profiles of affect and threat reactions. Moreover, the results indicate that specific 
classes of threat were related to specific, functionally relevant emotions, and 
groups similar in the threat profiles were also similar in the emotion profiles they 
elicited. These results suggest that future research on affective (and behavioral) 
responses to social discrimination should consider the different threats elicited 
by different groups. Moreover, an important agenda for future research should 
be to differentiate more precisely the threat of different perpetrator groups by 
identifying, for example, perpetrator’s and target’s underlying motives and goals. 
 
4.4 Implications for long-term consequences 
This thesis has examined the immediate affective response of self- and 
other-directed anger after the experience of a negative group-based treatment. 
Subsequently, the implications of the effects found for long-term consequences 
on behavioral strategies, health, and legitimizing beliefs of social discrimination 
are discussed. 
 
Anger and social identification impacting on behavioral strategies 
Whereas the main focus of the discussion until now was on the 
Attribution by Identification interaction on self-directed anger, the discussion will 
now focus on the main effect of the type of attribution to a negative treatment. 
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So far, research has mostly studied the impact of social discrimination on 
depressive mood (e.g., Branscombe et al., 1999; McCoy & Major, 2003; Major 
et al., 2002), but little attention has been paid to Weiner’s (1985) notion of the 
direction of affect. The two directions – self-directed versus other-directed anger 
– trigger different behavioral responses. Other-directed anger is likely to trigger 
action tendencies towards the perpetrator of discrimination, whereas self-
directed anger is less likely to elicit this type of action tendency. Mackie and 
colleagues (Mackie et al., 2000; Mackie & Smith, 2002) showed that group-
based anger mediates the effects of perceived ingroup strength on action 
tendencies towards the outgroup. Furthermore, much research has examined 
the impact of social identification on collective action. According to this line of 
research, only high identifiers will pursue collective action (for a review see 
Tropp & Wright, 2002). Unlike the current studies, these studies investigated the 
impact of social discrimination on action tendencies against an outgroup and 
not towards a single perpetrator. Nonetheless, these results suggest that further 
research should also examine action tendencies resulting from individual (i.e. 
without other ingroup members present) experiences of social discrimination.  
In the field of social discrimination, research on coping strategies has 
examined individualistic and group-level coping strategies (Branscombe & 
Ellemers, 1998). This research did not differentiate between coping strategies 
as response to illegitimate social discrimination versus legitimate differentiation. 
Based on the results of Study 5, it seems worthwhile to pay attention to this 
moderator, as legitimizing beliefs on the side of the stigmatized have an 
important impact on their responses to social discrimination. Furthermore, future 
research should identify adaptive coping strategies that result from self-directed 
anger. 
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The impact of anger on health 
Besides triggering action tendencies in the short run, anger also elicits 
health problems in the long run. Research has suggested that the related traits 
of hostility, anger, and aggressiveness are risk factors for coronary heart 
disease (for an overview see Smith, Glazer, Ruiz, & Gallo, 2004). Further 
research has shown that African-Americans respond to social discrimination 
with anger, cardiovascular reactivity, and resting blood pressure (for an 
overview see Clark et al., 1999). Unfortunately, this research has not 
differentiated between self- and other-directed anger, and the impact of social 
identification. Nonetheless, taken together with the present results these 
findings incorporate a two-sided message: on the one hand these findings 
suggest that social identification with one’s stigmatized group might help to 
prevent coronary heart disease that could otherwise result from the frequent 
experience of illegitimate social discrimination. On the other hand it could also 
worsen coronary heart disease which would result from the frequent experience 
of legitimate differentiation. Legitimizing beliefs may help the target to justify the 
experience of differentiation and also social discrimination in the short run, but 
these findings further suggest that this leads to more coronary heart disease in 
the long run. 
 
The devastating impact of perceived legitimacy 
Individuals of some stigmatized groups belief that they deserve the 
negative treatment they face (for a review see Taylor et al., 1994). Legitimizing 
beliefs even foster the perception that a negative treatment is fair and one 
deserves the inequality (e.g., Jost & Major, 2001). This evidence has a 
devastating effect on the hope that social change will fight social discrimination 
and differentiation. This present research has investigated the impact of short-
term experience of a negative but legitimate group-based treatment (i.e. 
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differentiation) by implementing stereotype threat. So far it is unclear how the 
long-term experience of social discrimination impacts on the perception of 
legitimacy of this negative group-based treatment. Thus, it is important that 
future research investigates the process of how the perceived legitimacy of a 
negative group-based treatment changes over time – from the perception of an 
incidence of social discrimination to an incidence of differentiation. This seems 
especially worthwhile because individuals experiencing differentiation may not 
want to pay the costs of taking action. In the long run this ‘false consciousness’ 
will worsen health problems and, ultimately, inhibit social change. 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
To conclude, facing social discrimination has severe consequences for 
the target in the long run. In this thesis targets who are experiencing a negative 
treatment due to their own group membership have been studied as active 
respondents in intergroup relations and not only as passive victims by 
investigating their immediate response of self- and other-directed anger. 
Furthermore, the present findings demonstrate that, when facing illegitimate 
social discrimination, high levels of social identification protect the individual 
insofar as higher identification decreases self-directed anger. This buffering 
impact disappears when facing legitimate differentiation. In this case, higher 
identification leads to an increase of self-directed anger. Thus, the perceived 
legitimacy of an incidence of a negative group-based treatment plays a crucial 
role in the response to it. These results are a further step towards a better 
understanding of the impact of social identification on the target’s affective 
responses following the experience of an incidence of social discrimination or 
differentiation. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 7: Standardized regression weights from multiple regressions of self-
directed anger (SDA) and other-directed anger (ODA) on attribution 
and social identification in Study 1 (N = 67), Study 2 (N = 94), and 
Study 4 (N = 103). 
 Study 1 Study 2 Study 4 
 SDA ODA SDA ODA SDA ODA 
Attribution1 contrast 
(social -1, external 0, internal 1) 
.20* -.46*** .52*** -.23* .35*** -.24* 
Attribution2 contrast 
(social 0, external -1, internal 1) 
.63*** -.47*** .40*** -.23* .17 -.39***
Identification 
 
-.12 .04 .01 .31*** -.03 -.05 
Attribution1 x Identification 
 
.23* .03 .21** .01 .24* .05 
Attribution2 x Identification 
 
-.06 .06 -.08 .07 .04 -.03 
Note: *: p < .05, **: p < .01 
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SUMMARY 
 
Psychologists agree that being a target of social discrimination is 
associated with negative psychological and physiological consequences in the 
long run (for an overview see Clark, Anderson, Clark, & Williams, 1999). To 
date, research on the affective response of being a target of social 
discrimination has focused primarily on depressive mood (for an overview see 
Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002). First, this research presented extends the 
previous research by investigating the impact of social discrimination on two 
immediate affective responses, namely self- and other-directed anger. Second, 
previous research has shown that social identification moderates the impact of 
social discrimination on depressive mood (e.g., Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 
1999; McCoy & Major, 2003). The impact of social identification on both types of 
anger when facing a negative treatment was therefore examined. Third, specific 
beliefs (e.g., legitimizing myth of social stereotypes, Crocker, Major, & Steel, 
1998) are likely to legitimize a negative treatment that is attributed to own group 
membership (for an overview see Jost & Major, 2001). Thus, including 
perceived legitimacy as a further factor would extend the research considerably. 
Five studies aimed to investigate these three goals by using different social 
groups and domains. 
The first goal was addressed in Studies 1-4. The type of attribution of the 
negative treatment was predicted to impact differently on self- and on other-
directed anger. In line with the prediction, a negative treatment attributed to 
social discrimination and to external factors results in higher levels of other-
directed anger compared to negative treatment attributed to internal factors. 
Conversely, a negative treatment attributed internally results in higher levels of 
self-directed anger compared to a treatment attributed to social discrimination or 
to external factors.
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Besides, Studies 1-4 focussed on the second goal, which was to 
examine the impact of social identification in this context. The type of attribution 
of a negative treatment was expected to moderate the impact of social 
identification on self-directed anger. As hypothesized, the results revealed that 
stronger identification resulted in less self-directed anger after an attribution to 
social discrimination (i.e. buffering effect), but not after an external or an internal 
attribution. In part, Study 3 assessed the causal direction of the effect: Social 
identification impacted on self-directed anger and not the other way around. 
This effect only occurred when a negative treatment was attributed to social 
discrimination; no relationship between the two variables was found when it was 
attributed to the inappropriate behavior of the perpetrator. Furthermore, the 
buffering impact of social identification on self-directed anger when facing social 
discrimination was found both in scenario studies (Studies 1-3) and also in real 
life experiences of social discrimination (Study 4). 
Study 5 pursued the third goal. This study set out to test whether the 
perceived legitimacy of a negative group-based treatment moderates the effect 
of social identification on self-directed anger. Only when a negative group-
based treatment was attributed to social discrimination, i.e. it was perceived to 
be illegitimate, strong social identification served as a buffer and lead to a 
decrease in self-directed anger. This impact was reversed if the negative group-
based treatment was attributed to differentiation, i.e. it was perceived to be 
legitimate. In this case, strong social identification harmed the individual’s 
emotional vulnerability by increasing levels of self-directed anger. 
In conclusion, the research presented here could extend previous 
findings regarding the impact of social identification on depressive mood as a 
response to social discrimination to the affective response of self- and other-
directed anger. The results presented here are a first step to shedding light on 
the previous contradictory results regarding the impact of social identification on 
depressive mood after experiencing social discrimination (e.g., Branscombe et 
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al., 1999; McCoy & Major, 2003). These results are a further step towards a 
better understanding of the impact of social identification on affective responses 
following the experience of a negative group-based treatment which is 
perceived as illegitimate social discrimination or legitimate differentiation. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
 
Unter Psychologen herrscht Einigkeit, dass länger andauerndes, 
wiederholtes Erleben sozialer Diskriminierung zu negativen psychologischen 
und physiologischen Konsequenzen führt (für einen Überblick s. Clark, 
Anderson, Clark, & Williams, 1999). Die bisherige Forschung zur affektiven 
Reaktion auf soziale Diskriminierung hat sich hauptsächlich auf die Betrachtung 
von depressiver Stimmung beschränkt (für einen Überblick s. Major, Quinton, & 
McCoy, 2002). Zum einen erweitert die vorliegende Arbeit die bisherige 
Forschung, in dem sie erstmalig den Einfluss von sozialer Diskriminierung auf 
zwei sofortige affektive Reaktionen, selbst- und fremdgerichteter Ärger, in den 
Blick nimmt. Zum zweiten hat bisherige Forschung belegt, dass soziale 
Identifikation den Einfluss von sozialer Diskriminierung auf depressive 
Stimmung moderiert (z.B. Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999; McCoy & 
Major, 2003). Daher wurde untersucht, ob es auch einen Einfluss sozialer 
Identifikation auf beide Arten von Ärger nach der Erfahrung einer negativen 
Behandlung gibt. Zum dritten können spezifische Überlegungen (z.B. der 
legitimierende Mythos von sozialen Stereotypen, Crocker, Major, & Steel, 1998) 
eine negative Behandlung, die man aufgrund der eigenen 
Gruppenzugehörigkeit erfährt, legitimieren (für einen Überblick s. Jost & Major, 
2001). Aus diesem Grund wurde die wahrgenommene Legitimität einer 
negativen Behandlung als weiterer Faktor in die Forschung einbezogen, um die 
bisherigen Befunde zu erweitern. Diese drei Aspekte wurden in fünf Studien mit 
verschiedenen sozialen Gruppen und in unterschiedlichen Domains untersucht. 
Der erste Aspekt wurde in den Studien 1-4 behandelt. Die Art der 
Attribution der negativen Behandlung sollte einen unterschiedlichen Einfluss auf 
selbst- und fremdgerichteten Ärger haben. Wie erwartet führte eine negative 
Behandlung aufgrund sozialer Diskriminierung und aufgrund externaler 
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Faktoren zu höherem fremdgerichteten Ärger im Vergleich zu einer negativen 
Behandlung aufgrund internaler Faktoren. Umgekehrt führte eine negative 
Behandlung aufgrund internaler Faktoren zu höherem selbstgerichteten Ärger 
im Vergleich zu einer negativen Behandlung aufgrund sozialer Diskriminierung 
oder externaler Faktoren. 
Darüber hinaus behandelten die Studien 1-4 ebenfalls den zweiten 
Aspekt dieser Arbeit, den Einfluss der sozialen Identifikation in diesem Kontext 
zu identifizieren. Es wurde die Vorhersage gemacht, dass der Einfluss der 
sozialen Identifikation auf selbstgerichteten Ärger durch die Art der Attribution 
einer negativen Behandlung moderiert wird. Wie erwartet führte höhere soziale 
Identifikation nach einer Attribution auf soziale Diskriminierung zu weniger 
selbstgerichtetem Ärger (puffernder Effekt) nicht aber nach einer externalen 
oder internalen Attribution. Studie 3 analysierte die kausale Richtung dieses 
Effektes: Soziale Identifikation beeinflusste selbstgerichteten Ärger, aber nicht 
anders herum. Dieser Effekt trat nur dann auf, wenn eine negative Behandlung 
auf soziale Diskriminierung attribuiert wurde. Kein Zusammenhang der beiden 
Variablen wurde nach einer Attribution auf unangemessenes Verhalten des 
Täters gefunden. Dieser puffernde Effekt sozialer Identifikation auf 
selbstgerichtete Wut nach sozialer Diskriminierung wurde sowohl in 
Szenariostudien (Studien 1-3) als auch für reale eigene Erfahrungen von 
sozialer Diskriminierung (Studie 4) gefunden. 
Der dritte Aspekt dieser Dissertation wurde in Studie 5 bearbeitet. Diese 
Studie untersuchte, ob wahrgenommene Legitimität einer negativen 
gruppenbasierten Behandlung den Effekt von sozialer Identifikation auf 
selbstgerichteten Ärger moderiert. Nur wenn eine negative gruppenbasierte 
Behandlung auf soziale Diskriminierung attribuiert wurde (d.h. wenn sie als 
illegitim wahrgenommen wird), wirkte starke soziale Identifikation als Puffer und 
führte zu einer Abnahme von selbstgerichtetem Ärger. Dieser Effekt drehte sich 
um, wenn eine negative gruppenbasierte Behandlung auf Differenzierung 
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attribuiert wurde (d.h. wenn sie als legitim wahrgenommen wurde). In diesem 
Fall verstärkte hohe soziale Identifikation die individuelle emotionale 
Verletzbarkeit durch höheren selbstgerichteten Ärger. 
Zusammenfassend bleibt festzuhalten, dass es mit den vorliegenden 
Studien gelungen ist, bisherige Befunde hinsichtlich der affektiven Reaktion auf 
soziale Diskriminierung zu erweitern. Analog zur depressiven Stimmung als 
affektive Reaktion auf soziale Diskriminierung liefern die Studien Erkenntnisse 
in Bezug auf den Einfluss sozialer Identifikation auf selbst- und 
fremdgerichteten Ärger. Mit Hilfe dieser Ergebnisse gelingt es, bisherige 
kontroverse Befunde zum Einfluss der sozialen Identifikation auf depressive 
Stimmung nach sozialer Diskriminierung näher zu betrachten und aufzulösen 
(z.B. Branscombe et al., 1999; McCoy & Major, 2003). Diese Ergebnisse sind 
somit ein weiterer Schritt zu einem besseren Verständnis vom Einfluss sozialer 
Identifikation auf affektive Reaktionen nach der Erfahrung einer negativen 
gruppenbasierten Behandlung, die entweder als illegitime soziale 
Diskriminierung oder als legitime Differenzierung wahrgenommen wird.
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